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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, criminal justice has been marked by a surge
in the popularity of evidence-based practices.1 The evidencebased criminal justice movement promises to lower both incarceration rates and crime through the use of big data, science,
new technology, and smart-on-crime policies. This idea has
broad appeal across the political spectrum and has had a large
impact on law and policy, particularly since the budgetary crises
of the recent recession.2
At the forefront of the evidence-based criminal justice movement are algorithmic risk assessment tools.3 Risk assessment
tools are designed to predict the likelihood that someone will
commit crime in the future.4 They are generated by statistically
analyzing large data sets to identify correlations between future
crime (as measured by rearrest or reconviction) and factors such
as age, gender, criminal record, employment status, education
level, etc. The predictions of the risk assessment are used to help
determine restrictions on liberty: pretrial custody status, the
length of the sentence, probation supervision levels, parole, and
more.5 Their use has been rapidly expanding across the country.
As Professor Sonja Starr puts it: “It is an understatement to refer to risk assessment as a criminal justice trend. Rather, we are
1. See infra Part I.A (providing examples of evidence-based practices and
ideas integrated into law).
2. See Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 566–67 (2015) (discussing the extent to
which evidence-based practices have been incorporated into law); infra Part I.A
(providing examples of evidence-based practices and ideas integrated into law).
3. Risk assessments are listed as number one on multiple lists of evidencebased practices in criminal justice. See, e.g., CRIME & JUSTICE INST., IMPLEMENTING EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS: THE PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION 3 (2004), https://s3.amazonaws.com/static
.nicic.gov/Library/019342.pdf; NAT’L INST. CORR., A FRAMEWORK FOR EVIDENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING IN LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 13
(2010), https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/024372.pdf.
4. See generally infra Part III.F (defining risk assessment tools and introducing their methods).
5. See ANGÈLE CHRISTIN ET AL., DATA & CIVIL RIGHTS, COURTS AND PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS 2–3 (2015), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/
upload_documents/Angele%20Christin.pdf (describing how risk assessment is
used around the country).
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already in the risk assessment era.”6 Proponents of risk assessment argue that by replacing the subjective, error-prone, and adhoc assessments of judges with scientifically validated prediction
tools it is possible to dramatically reduce incarceration rates
without affecting public safety.7 In one of the most carefully executed instances of the literature, the authors conduct a policy
simulation that shows “[c]rime reductions up to 24.7% with no
change in jailing rates, or jailing rate reductions up to 41.9%
with no increase in crime rates” as the result of making pretrial
custody decisions on the basis of a risk assessment algorithm.8
Critics of risk assessment raise a number of issues, but the question that has perhaps received the most attention is the extent
to which risk assessment tools are racist themselves. This concern was voiced by former Attorney General Eric Holder,9 and
reflected in a widely-read study by ProPublica that claimed that
black defendants who did not reoffend were more than twice as
likely to be wrongly classified as high risk than white defendants.10
Despite the heated rhetoric on both sides of the aisle, virtually nothing is known about how the implementation of risk assessment affects key outcomes: incarceration rates, crime, misconduct, or racial disparities.11 The empirical research
evaluating whether outcomes are improved by incorporating algorithmic risk assessment into the decision-making framework
is beyond thin; it is close to non-existent.12 Many of the “facts”
that are cited about the impacts of risk assessment come from
6. Sonja B. Starr, The Risk Assessment Era: An Overdue Debate, 27 FED.
SENT’G REP. 205, 205 (2015).
7. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence,
90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 553 (2012); Jon Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions and
Machine Predictions, 133 Q. J. ECON. 237, 240–41 (2018).
8. Kleinberg et al., supra note 7, at 238.
9. Massimo Calabresi, Exclusive: Attorney General Eric Holder to Oppose
Data-Driven Sentencing, TIME (July 31, 2014), http://time.com/3061893/holder
-to-oppose-data-driven-sentencing (discussing Holder’s concerns that risk assessment will disadvantage the poor and minorities).
10. Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we
-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm.
11. See Richard Berk, An Impact Assessment of Machine Learning Risk
Forecasts on Parole Board Decisions and Recidivism, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL
CRIMINOLOGY 193, 194 (2017) (stating that debates around risk assessment
“have unfolded with scant information about how actuarial risks assessments
have affected practices and outcomes”); infra Part II.C (offering an overview of
the risk assessment evaluation literature).
12. Berk, supra note 11.
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sources that range from detail-light non-academic reports put
out by the agencies who designed the risk tool to nothing more
than a single slide in a Power Point presentation.13 Somehow,
criminal justice risk assessment has gained the near-universal
reputation of being an evidence-based practice despite the fact
that there is virtually no research showing that it has been effective.
There is ample research by social scientists suggesting that
risk assessment tools should have beneficial effects.14 Risk assessment tools have been shown to be predictive of future arrest,
and there is research suggesting (although not definitively) that
they are better at predicting future arrest than judges are. This
is the evidence that has earned risk assessment the “evidencebased” moniker, and the sheen of scientific credibility that this
moniker entails likely contributed to the exponential growth in
its use. But transforming a practice that should be beneficial to
one that actually does provide benefit is not always straightforward. The same human foibles that champions of risk assessment point to when arguing for the adoption of risk assessment
tools also complicate risk assessment as a policy. For instance,
risk assessment tools may not be used as designed: they may be
ignored or used off-label to accomplish something other than
what was intended.15 Judges may not understand exactly what
the risk score is measuring, or what level of statistical risk is
associated with each risk category. The tool may be good at predicting misconduct, but the interventions taken to ameliorate
risk may actually exacerbate it. The pressures of re-election or
re-appointment may impact how and when the risk tool is used.
This Article attempts to shift the conversation on risk assessment away from the abstract and toward the practical.
While it might seem futuristic to use artificial intelligence to determine someone’s freedom, the impacts of risk assessment depend on the same good-old-fashioned factors that have helped
and hindered reform for centuries: context, incentives, and details of implementation. Behind risk assessments are people and
design choices. What level of judicial discretion to allow? What
13. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II.A (outlining scholarship that discusses the effectiveness of human intuition as compared to actuarial tools).
15. Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (arguing
that the risk assessment tools used at sentencing were not designed for that
purpose); Sandra Mayson, Off-Label Law Enforcement (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing various ways criminal law is used to
accomplish something other than intended).
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criminal justice interventions to recommend for each risk group?
How to communicate statistical risk to the decision-makers?
What accountability measures are in place? Getting these
choices right may take time and revision; determining what constitutes right takes discussion amongst stakeholders.16
This Article also presents some of the first rigorous empirical evidence on the impacts of risk assessment in practice. In
particular, it focuses on the role of risk assessment in the rapidly
proliferating bail reform movement. In the last few years, dozens
of jurisdictions have reduced the use of monetary bail and
adopted risk assessment tools to help determine pretrial custody.17 In doing so, they have followed in the footsteps of one of
bail reform’s pioneers: the bluegrass state of Kentucky.18 The
bail reform bill recently adopted by California’s legislature was
modeled after Kentucky’s “shining example.”19 The most widelyused pretrial risk assessment tool in the country, the Public
Safety Assessment (PSA), was developed and piloted in Kentucky.20 The bipartisan bail reform bill proposed by Senators
Rand Paul (R-KY) and Kamala Harris (D-CA) would induce
states to adopt a Kentucky-style pretrial system.21
16. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 583 (2018) (providing a framework
for determining how risk assessments should be used, based on the fit principle,
validity principle, and the fairness principle).
17. See infra Part I.C (discussing the current bail reform movement).
18. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCH.,
MOVING BEYOND MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 19 (2016), http://cjpp.law
.harvard.edu/publications/primer-bail-reform (highlighting Kentucky’s use of
pretrial risk assessment as an example that other jurisdictions are following);
ARTHUR W. PEPIN, CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, EVIDENCE-BASED
PRETRIAL RELEASE 8–9 (2012–2013), https://www.pretrial.org/download/policy
-statements/Evidence%20Based%20Pre-Trial%20Release%20-%20COSCA%20
2012.pdf (citing Kentucky as an example of “successful implementation of evidence-based pretrial assessments”); Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes
.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-a-science.html?_r=0
(“Kentucky has used a risk-assessment tool for decades, and is a leader among
states when it comes to court appearance rates and low recidivism.”).
19. Samantha Young, To Fix ‘Unfair’ Bail System, Will California Copy
Kentucky?, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.dailynews.com/2017/
08/13/to-fix-unfair-bail-system-will-california-copy-kentucky.
20. See infra note 260, at 3, 5.
21. See Kamala D. Harris & Rand Paul, Opinion, To Shrink Our Jails, Let’s
Reform Bail, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
07/20/opinion/kamala-harris-and-rand-paul-lets-reform-bail.html (stating that
their proposed bill empowers states to build on best practices, citing Kentucky’s
use of risk assessments as an example of such practices).
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Using detailed data on more than a million criminal cases,
this Article analyzes the use of pretrial risk assessment in Kentucky. Kentucky has had some sort of pretrial risk tool available
to judges since 1976; however, its use was optional and many
judges disregarded it. In 2011, Kentucky passed a law (House
Bill 463, or HB 463)22 that made use of pretrial risk assessment
mandatory and declared a presumptive default of immediate,
non-monetary release for all low and moderate-risk defendants.23 Despite being crafted with the explicit goal of lowering
incarceration rates,24 HB 463 led to only a trivial increase in pretrial release.25 Furthermore, the increase in the release rate was
matched by an uptick in failure-to-appear (FTA) rates and pretrial crime;26 a disappointing counter to hopes that all three margins could be improved simultaneously. The low increase in releases is partly because judges took advantage of the discretion
allowed to them by law and ignored the presumptive default of
non-monetary release in more than two-thirds of cases.27 But
this is not the whole story. In fact, HB 463 led to a marked
change in bail-setting practices. There was a 63% increase in the
rate at which judges granted non-monetary release for low-risk

22. Public Safety and Offender Accountability Act, H.B. 463, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2011).
23. Ninety percent of defendants were ranked as low or moderate risk. KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066(2) (West 2011) (codifying H.B. 463) (instructing
judges to consider the risk assessment when considering release and bail); id.
§ 431.066(3) (instructing release on unsecured bond or own recognizance for low
risk defendants); id. § 431.066(4) (instructing release on unsecured bond or own
recognizance for moderate risk defendants with possible supervision, monitoring or other conditions of release); id. § 27A.096(1)–(3) (West 2011) (instructing
judges to follow guidelines set by the Supreme Court on pretrial release or supervision for moderate and high risk defendants); SUPREME COURT OF KY., ORDER APPROVING JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE AND MONITORED
CONDITIONAL RELEASE (2011–2012), http://courts.ky.gov/courts/supreme/
Rules_Procedures/201112.pdf (generally affirming the centrality of the risk assessment tool in the release decision although granting judges the latitude to
deviate from it; instructing pretrial services to develop a risk reduction plan
including various conditions of release for judges to consider for high risk defendants).
24. HB 463 was drafted with the goals of reducing incarceration rates while
maintaining public safety. See Senator Tom Jensen & Representative John Tilley, HB 463 – Statement from the Sponsors, in CRIMINAL LAW REFORM: THE
FIRST YEAR OF HB 463 1 (2012), http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/kybar.site-ym.com/
resource/resmgr/2012_Convention_Files/ac2012_2.pdf.
25. See infra Part III.D (discussing risk assessment’s impact on bond-setting practices).
26. Infra Figure 7.
27. Based on author’s own calculations.
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defendants, and a more moderate increase in release for moderate-risk defendants.28 High-risk defendants were released at
lower rates.29 Thus, while there was a change in the type of defendants released, as well as the conditions of release, the net
effects on the overall release rate were small. Furthermore, they
were not permanent: the sharp change in practices and outcomes
that occurred right after the law was implemented eroded over
time as judges returned to their previous bail-setting practices.30
Within a couple of years, the pretrial release rate was lower than
it was before the bill, and lower than the national average.31
As for racial disparities, the story is less straightforward.
Facially, HB 463 benefited white defendants more than blacks.32
However, this is not because the risk assessment was more racially biased than judicial discretion. Rather, it is due to regional
differences in how judges responded to HB 463.33 Judges from
predominantly white rural counties liberalized their bail setting
practices more than judges from more racially mixed urban areas, but within the same county, white and black defendants saw
similar increases in release.34 Once county effects were taken
into account, racial disparities remain constant throughout the
time period of the analysis.35
In 2013 Kentucky adopted a new risk assessment tool called
the PSA.36 This tool was developed by the Laura & John Arnold
Foundation using a nationally representative dataset of more
than 1.5 million observations.37 Since it was first piloted in Kentucky, it has received considerable national attention and has
28. See infra Part III.D (discussing the empirical effects of H.B. 463).
29. Id.
30. The fact that judges drifted back to their previous bail setting habits
means that a randomized control trial that evaluated only short term effects
would overstate its impact.
31. In 2015, twenty-six percent of Kentucky’s felony defendants were released within a day. In contrast, fifty percent of felony defendants were released
within a day of arrest in the most comprehensive national-level dataset available. BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS
IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 – STATISTICAL TABLES 18 (2013).
32. Infra Figure 11.
33. See infra Part III.F (evaluating whether risk assessment affected racial
disparities in bond-setting practices).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See infra Part III.A (offering an overview of Kentucky’s use of pretrial
risk assessments).
37. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT: RISK
FACTORS AND FORMULA 2 (2013–2016), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp
-content/uploads/PSA-Risk-Factors-and-Formula.pdf.
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become one of the most widely used pretrial risk assessment
tools.38 The switch from Kentucky’s local risk assessment tool to
the PSA did not result in any noticeable improvement in outcomes. There was a small increase in the use of non-financial
bond, and essentially no effect on releases, FTAs, pretrial crime,
or racial disparities in detention.39
As a case study, Kentucky offers important lessons for the
bail reform movement, as well as for jurisdictions that have implemented or are considering implementing risk assessment in
other criminal justice contexts.40 First, Kentucky’s experience
should temper hopes that risk assessment is a magic bullet that
will increase the number of people released pretrial with no concomitant costs in terms of the crime or appearance rate. Risk
assessment may offer improvements over the status quo, but
have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too promises are, as of yet, unsubstantiated.41 Second, the Kentucky findings should ease (but not
eliminate) concerns that risk assessment tools will exacerbate
racial disparities. While pretrial risk assessment did not affect
racial disparities in Kentucky once regional trends were accounted for, scholars should continue to evaluate this question
in other jurisdictions. Third, Kentucky demonstrates the challenges of trying to change criminal justice decision-making
through technocratic reform. Kentucky’s statutes express a
strong presumption of pretrial release, which accords with the
stated goals of the bill’s sponsors.42 If judges followed the action-

38. See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT:
A RE-VALIDATION AND ASSESSMENT OF PREDICTIVE UTILITY AND DIFFERENTIAL
PREDICTION BY RACE AND GENDER IN KENTUCKY 5 (2018), http://www.arnold
foundation.org/the-psa-a-re-validation-and-assessment-of-predictive-utility
-and-differential-prediction-by-race-and-gender-in-kentucky/ (stating that the
PSA is currently being used in thirty-eight jurisdictions including three entire
states) [hereinafter LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., A RE-VALIDATION].
39. See infra Parts III.D, III.E, and III.F.
40. Dozens of jurisdictions have recently adopted risk assessment tools, and
others are actively considering it. See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., A REVALIDATION, supra note 38, at 5 (reporting that the PSA, piloted in Kentucky
in 2013, is now in use in thirty-eight jurisdictions including three entire states,
three of the largest cities, and two of the largest jail systems); Starr, supra note
6, at 1 (observing that risk assessment is being used in sentencing in at least
twenty states).
41. See infra Part II.C (offering an overview of the risk assessment evaluation literature).
42. See Senator Jensen & Representative Tilley, supra note 24, at 2 (“The
reforms in House Bill 463 are expected to bring a gross savings of $422 million
over ten years by reducing the state’s burgeoning prison population.”).
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directives associated with the risk assessment—the statutory instructions that set a presumptive default for how defendants
with differing risk levels are to be treated—90% of defendants
would be granted immediate non-financial release. In practice,
only 29% are released on non-monetary bond at the first bailsetting. If judges are not convinced or coerced to follow statutory
guidelines, a risk assessment tool will not be an effective method
of liberalizing release.
Ultimately, this Article calls for a change in how evidencebased criminal justice is practiced and conceived. A practice
should not be considered evidence-based because it references
big data sets and sophisticated techniques—it should be considered evidence-based because its impacts have been carefully researched and understood. Rapid proliferation of a method with
no knowledge of its effects is risky. Further, it precludes meaningful dialogue between the many well-intentioned individuals
who want our criminal justice system to improve but have differing expectations about what the new tool will bring.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief overview of evidence-based criminal justice, risk assessments, and
the current bail reform movement. Part II discusses the empirical literature on risk assessment: the papers that claim that risk
assessment tools are better at predicting future crime than
judges, the recent studies of racial bias in risk assessments, and
the slim set of research on the impacts of risk assessment in
practice. In discussing the literature, Part II also explores some
of the reasons why the impacts of risk assessment may be different or more complicated than expected. Part III presents an empirical evaluation of pretrial risk assessment in Kentucky. In
particular, it uses graphical time-trend analysis to show how HB
463 and the adoption of the PSA affected bail practices, release
rates, pretrial misconduct, and racial disparities. Part IV discusses various lessons that can be drawn from Kentucky’s experience with risk assessment.
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I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EVIDENCE-BASED CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, RISK ASSESSMENT, AND BAIL REFORM
A. EVIDENCE-BASED CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The “evidence-based” moniker is used in a variety of subjects
and refers to the idea that practices should be rigorously evaluated for their efficacy.43 The phrase was first used in the medical
literature of the early 1990s:44 “evidence-based medicine” became the key term to describe a movement toward practices that
had been proven effective in clinical trial as opposed to those
supported only by anecdote or opinion.45 The phrase “evidencebased” was first applied to criminal justice in the late 1990s,46
but a shift toward evaluating criminal justice programs for their
efficacy had begun long before that.47 In 1974, Robert Martinson
published a synthesis of research in correctional programs that
was broadly interpreted as showing that nothing works (i.e., that
programs designed to rehabilitate offenders do not actually
lower crime).48 This study was one of the factors that led to a
shift away from the rehabilitative model of corrections that had
previously dominated the field and is often marked by scholars
as the beginning of the New Penology:49 a paradigm in criminal
justice which prioritizes risk management, not rehabilitation.50
Criminologists, however, did not abandon hopes that certain
criminal justice programs were effective. The rapid expansion of
computer power in the 1980s and 1990s paralleled a rapid expansion of criminal justice research, and scholars began to iden-

43. See STAN ORCHOWSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO EVIDENCE-BASED PRAC2 (2014).
44. Gordon Guyatt et al., Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach to
Teaching the Practice of Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420, 2420 (1992).
45. ORCHOWSKY, supra 43, at 2–3. A 1976 report from the U.S. Office of
Technology Assessment stated that “only 10 to 20% of all procedures used in
present medical practice have been proven by clinical trial.” OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, ASSESSING THE EFFICACY AND SAFETY OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 7 (1978).
46. ORCHOWSKY, supra note 43, at 3.
47. Id. at 2–4.
48. Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974).
49. Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449,
449–50 (1992).
50. Id. at 455.
TICES
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tify a selection of policies that appeared to be effective at reducing crime.51 The idea that nothing works slowly lost ground in
favor of the idea that some methods do work. The evidence-based
criminal justice movement aims to identify and expand the use
of practices that social science research has demonstrated to be
effective.52 Partly as a result of efforts by organizations such as
the National Institute of Corrections and the Justice Reinvestment Initiative, the ideas associated with evidence-based criminal justice gained popularity throughout the 2000s and are now
core to law and policy around the country.53
The Office of Justice Programs provides a useful definition
of key terms. It considers practices to be evidence-based “when
their effectiveness has been demonstrated by causal evidence obtained through high-quality outcome evaluations.”54 Outcome
evaluations refer to social science research that attempts to infer
the causal impact of a particular program or policy by comparing
outcomes for a group of people affected by that policy to outcomes
for a control group of people not affected by that policy.55 The
extent to which research can be interpreted as evidence of a
causal relationship between a policy and an outcome depends on
the extent to which other explanations for the correlation can be
ruled out.56 Determining whether a particular policy is evidencebased depends on the quality, quantity, and consistency of the
social science research demonstrating its impact.57
The ideas and practices associated with evidence-based
criminal justice have made significant headway into law and policy at the state, local, and federal level.58 This includes general
55.

51. See ORCHOWSKY, supra note 43, at 3–4; Klingele, supra note 2, at 544–

52. CRIME & JUSTICE INST., supra note 3, at 1–3.
53. See Klingele, supra note 2, at 551–67 for an excellent overview of the
rise of evidence-based criminal justice.
54. Glossary: Evidence-Based Programs, CRIMESOLUTIONS.GOV, https://
www.crimesolutions.gov/GlossaryDetails.aspx?ID=15 (last visited Oct. 22,
2018).
55. For example, this Article compares pretrial release rates for the group
of defendants who were booked right before HB 463 was introduced, to pretrial
release rates for defendants who were booked right after HB 463 was implemented.
56. See CRIMESOLUTIONS.GOV, supra note 54.
57. The term evidence-based is sometimes used in a looser way, as simply
integrating the best available research into decision making and practice.
58. See ELIZABETH DAVIES ET AL., URBAN INST., THE JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE: THINKING LOCAL FOR STATE JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 1
(2015). The Justice Reinvestment Initiative has helped spread evidence-based
practices into twenty-four states. Annual Report 2016: Director’s Message, U.S.
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instructions to use evidence-based principles,59 specific instructions for the fraction of state expenditures that must be spent on
evidence-based practices,60 and orders to adopt specific evidencebased practices.61
B. CRIMINAL JUSTICE RISK ASSESSMENT
Evaluating the risk of future criminal activity has long been
part of practice in criminal justice. The term “risk assessment,”
however, usually refers to the use of formal, actuarial, and algorithmic methods of predicting the likelihood of future crime or
misconduct.62 (In practice, however, they predict what is visible:
arrest, conviction, reincarceration, probation revocation, etc.)63
Actuarial risk assessment tools have been in use in criminal justice since the 1920s,64 but their use has rapidly accelerated over
recent years.65 These tools help to determine bail or the conditions of release, set the sentence length, determine the level of
supervision for probationers, evaluate a request for parole, and

COURTS (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/annual-report-2016.
The director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts attributes a decline
in recidivism to their use of evidence-based practices.
59. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 6-201.01 (2017) (instructing probation
departments to develop evidence-based policies and procedures); IDAHO CODE
§ 20-219-5 (2016) (instructing the state board of corrections to use evidencebased practices in supervising probationers and parolees).
60. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27A.097(5) (West 2011) (stating that,
by July 1, 2016, seventy-five percent of “state moneys expended on supervision
and intervention programs . . . shall be for programs that are in accordance with
evidence-based practices”).
61. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2154.7 (2016) (adopting a risk assessment instrument in sentencing); S.B. 6204, 624 Leg. 1st Spec. Sess. §§ 11.1, 11.2
(Wash. 2012) (adopting swift and certain sanctions in community supervision).
62. See NAT’L INST. CORR., supra note 3, at 13 (noting that risk assessment
tools help to predict “risk of reoffense more effectively than professional judgement alone”).
63. See Sonja Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 855–57 (2014) (noting that
evidence-based sentencing tools do not actually tell judges how much crime a
defendant will commit in the future, but rather, the judge is told how risky a
defendant is based upon their past conduct).
64. See generally Howard G. Borden, Factors for Predicting Parole Success,
19 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 328 (1928) (discussing actuarial risk
assessment tools).
65. See Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L. J. 490, 493
(2017) (“It is hard to overstate the momentum behind this shift . . . Jurisdictions
around the country are increasingly turning to risk assessment as the keystone
of pretrial reform.”).
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choose the appropriate rehabilitative program or restriction on
liberty for juvenile offenders.66
Most risk assessment tools currently in use are fairly simple
checklist-style tools.67 These tools take a set of inputs, usually
between seven and fifteen, and assign a certain number of points
to each input.68 The points assigned to each input are determined through statistical analyses that evaluate how well each
input predicts the outcome.69 The inputs to a risk assessment
algorithm almost always include criminal history or criminaljustice-related misconduct.70 Some also include socio-economic
factors such as education level, marital status, or home neighborhood.71 Age and gender are often included, but race is not.72
The risk score is then calculated by summing the points assigned
to each input.73 Usually, the risk score is then aggregated to a
small group of risk classifications: people with the lowest scores
are labeled low risk, those with medium scores are labeled moderate risk, and those with the highest scores are labeled high
risk.74 The decision about what fraction of defendants belong in
each bin is a normative one.75
In addition to the checklist-style risk assessments described
above, there are more complicated methods of evaluating risk
that are developed through a method called machine learning.76
Machine-learned risk assessment tools are designed by a computer itself with a little guidance from the person that develops
them.77 The researcher tells the computer which inputs to use,
66. See CHRISTIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 2–3 and accompanying text (noting that risk assessment tools help to determine restrictions on liberty).
67. Mayson, supra note 65, at 509.
68. Id. at 511.
69. See id. at 513 (explaining the construction of common pretrial risk assessment instruments).
70. See id. at 512.
71. See Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual Recidivism in Sentencing Law, 47 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1, 14–18 (2015) (explaining
the construction of risk assessment instruments predicting violent or sexual
crime); Mayson, supra note 65, at 507–18 (explaining the construction of common pretrial risk assessment instruments).
72. CHRISTIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 1, 6.
73. Mayson, supra note 65, at 509.
74. Id. at 513.
75. See id. at 510–15 (discussing risk assessment tools and noting that classifications are validated against a class of individuals with known outcomes).
76. Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to
Inform Sentencing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 222, 222–24 (2015) (providing an overview of machine learned risk predictions in criminal justice).
77. Id.
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which outcomes to predict, and which learning method to use.78
The computer does the rest. Machine-learned risk assessments
tend to be black-box mechanisms; it is hard to understand why
they yield the predictions that they do.79 This is because the relationship between the inputs and the risk score is non-linear
and varied.80 For example, a machine-learned risk instrument
might show that the impact age has on the likelihood of future
arrest is different for people who are facing drug charges than
for those who are facing domestic violence charges.81 Machinelearned predictions can be more accurate than the simpler
checklist-style tools.82 However, they are still uncommon in
criminal justice. The black-box nature of the tool makes them
non-transparent, which raises legal and ethical issues:83 it is difficult to challenge a high-risk classification if one does not know
the reasons behind the classification.84 Furthermore, they require a higher level of technical training to build and implement.85
Often, the risk classifications come with explicit action-directives that specify how people in each of the risk categories are
to be treated.86 These action-directives take the form of statutory
instructions, rules, or local policy.87 A common principle is that

78. Id. at 223–27 (explaining the process of building criminal justice risk
assessments using machine learning tools).
79. Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: An “Unsettled” Proposition, 30 JUST. Q. 270, 284 (2013).
80. Id. at 285.
81. See Mayson, supra note 65, at 508, 514, 564 (noting that some traits,
like drug addiction, require some subjective judgement, that algorithms have
been developed to predict rearrest for domestic violence charges, and that age
is not an accurate predictor of violent crimes).
82. Berk & Hyatt, supra note 76, at 222.
83. See Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 267–71 (2015) (discussing legal issues related to transparency in risk assessment); Hannah-Moffatt, supra note
79, at 284–86 (discussing transparency concerns with risk assessment).
84. Hannah-Moffat, supra note 79, at 286.
85. See id. at 273 (noting that there is required training in order to use
general risk tools).
86. John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the Future of Bail Reform, WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). What I
call action-directives are sometimes also referred to as “structured decisionmaking process,” “pretrial decision-making matrix,” or a “decision making
framework.”
87. See id. at 41–42 (discussing the influence of local governments and communities on policy judgements).
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both rehabilitative interventions and restrictions on liberty increase as the risk level increases.88 The choice of what type of
risk to predict (i.e. what outcome in what time window), which
algorithm to use to predict that risk, how to divide the group into
different classification levels, and which criminal justice actions
(e.g. bail amounts, sentence lengths, etc.) are appropriate for
each risk level are all choices that depend, at least partially, on
the normative and legal landscape.89
Risk assessment tools are one of the most prominent and
widely adopted methods associated with the evidence-based
criminal justice movement.90 The National Institute of Corrections, an organization that has been deeply involved in the advancement of evidence-based criminal justice, ranks risk assessment tools at number one in a list of evidence-based ways to
reduce recidivism.91 Risk assessment tools are so closely tied to
the evidence-based movement that the terminology is sometimes
interchangeable: the use of risk assessment in sentencing is often referred to as simply evidence-based sentencing.92
C. RISK ASSESSMENT IN BAIL REFORM
The method of determining which defendants are released,
released on conditions, or detained pretrial has been one of the
most rapidly changing areas of criminal justice over the last couple of years.93 The current bail reform movement encourages decision-making based on the risk of flight or future crime, not the
ability to pay bail.94 Critics of the monetary bail system argue
that conditioning release on money results in racial and wealthbased disparities in detention, a waste of taxpayer money, and

88. See Mayson, supra note 65, at 515 (explaining different pretrial options
based upon defendant risk level).
89. See Hannah-Moffat, supra note 79, at 289–90 (discussing the various
choices that institutions make when instituting evidence-based sentencing).
90. Starr, supra note 63, at 805.
91. NAT’L INST. CORR., supra note 3, at 13.
92. See Starr, supra note 63, at 805 (discussing risk assessment tools in the
context of “evidence-based sentencing”).
93. For an overview of the history of bail, see TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, NAT’L
INST. CORR., FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR PRETRIAL PRACTITIONERS AND A FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN PRETRIAL REFORM 40–41 (2014).
94. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, Res. 112C, at 1, 6 (2017) (urging the prohibition of policies that result in pretrial detention solely on the ability to pay, and
providing that judges can order detention for those who have been shown, with
clear and convincing evidence, that no conditions of release will reasonably ensure appearance in court or public safety).
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harm to public safety.95 Defendants who pose a low risk of crime
or flight, they argue, should not be detained due to an inability
to pay monetary bail.96 Conversely, wealthy defendants who
pose a high risk of serious crime should not be released simply
because they can afford bail.97 Many, including this author, have
argued that pretrial detention or electronic monitoring should be
reserved for those who pose a high risk of violent crime or
flight.98 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, “[i]n our society
liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial
is the carefully limited exception.”99
Dozens, if not hundreds, of jurisdictions are pursuing or
have recently implemented wholesale changes to their bail practices.100 By a recent count, bail reform efforts are active in all but
a handful of states.101 Supporters of reform can be found across
party lines and across agencies: public defenders, district attorneys, judges, governors, sheriffs, and so forth.102
95. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 6–8.
96. Id. at 6.
97. See id. at 12 (observing that paying bail may not be an adequate incentive for some very wealthy defendants to appear).
98. Megan T. Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail,
in REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 21, 23 (Erik
Luna ed., 2017).
99. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
100. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., WHERE PRETRIAL IMPROVEMENTS ARE HAPPENING 1–5 (2017) (providing an overview of recent changes to pretrial practices
across the United States).
101. Id. at 15–17.
102. See, e.g., Tamara Aparton, SF Public Defenders Stand Up to Money
Bail, S.F. PUB. DEFENDER (Oct. 25, 2017), http://sfpublicdefender.org/news/
2017/10/sf-public-defenders-stand-up-to-money-bail (“In response to a pair of
major statewide developments in the fight to abolish money bail, San Francisco
public defenders will file challenges in every criminal case in which bail is set.”);
Megan Cassidy, Bond Companies ‘Extremely Worried’ as Arizona Moves Away
From Cash Bail Bonds, AZ CENT. (June 21, 2017), https://www.azcentral.com/
story/news/local/arizona/2017/06/21/arizona-courts-back-away-cash-bail
-system-bond-companies-worried/400209001 (“The state’s Supreme Court directs judges to minimize cash system bail bonds for pretrial release in favor of
risk-based analysis.”); Katie Greer, Bail System Failures Justify Reform, RIGHT
ON CRIME (Sept. 5, 2017), http://rightoncrime.com/2017/09/bail-system-failures
-justify-reform (“[C]ash based bail systems have failed to ensure public safety
or equal access to justice by jailing defendants who simply couldn’t afford to pay
bail.”); Christopher Keating, House Passes Governor’s Bail Reform, HARTFORD
COURANT (June 3, 2017), http://www.courant.com/politics/hc-legislature-bail
-reform-20170603-story.html (“The state House of Representatives voted Saturday to approve bail reform for those arrested for some misdemeanors, one of
Gov. Dannel P. Malloy’s highest priorities.”); Richard A. Oppel Jr., Defendants
Can’t Be Jailed Solely Because of Inability to Post Bail, Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES
(July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/us/chicago-bail-reform
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Bail reform is a rare area of bipartisan cooperation in the
U.S. Senate: Senator Kamala Harris (D-CA) and Senator Rand
Paul (R-KY) recently introduced a joint bill to use federal funding to encourage states to reform or replace the practice of money
bail.103 Change has come in the form of new legislation,104 revisions to state constitutions,105 new judiciary rules as decreed by
state courts,106 and as the result of civil rights litigation.107 Class
action lawsuits have been filed in jurisdictions across the country claiming that current bail practices violate due process protections and the Equal Rights Amendment.108 These lawsuits
have resulted in a number of consent decrees entailing reform to
local pretrial processes, as well as a landmark federal ruling,
ODonnell v. Harris County, ordering the pretrial release of misdemeanor defendants who cannot afford bail.109
In shifting the emphasis toward risk as opposed to the ability to pay bail, the recent bail reform movement has been inti.html (“Cook County sheriff, Tom Dart, who supports bail-reform efforts. . . .”);
Real Change in the DA’s Office, LARRY KRASNER FOR DA, https://krasnerforda
.com/platform (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) (“[Larry] will . . . reform our broken
cash bail system . . . [H]e will seek alternatives to incarceration – dramatically
reducing the number of prisoners held, saving millions of tax dollars, and letting
wounded communities begin to heal.”) (hereinafter KRASNER).
103. Pretrial Integrity and Safety Act, S. 1593, 115th Cong. (2017).
104. See, e.g., Mark Pazniokas & Keith M. Phaneuf, Bail Reform Wins Final
Passage in Senate, CONN. MIRROR (June 7, 2017), https://ctmirror.org/2017/06/
07/bail-reform-wins-final-passage-in-senate (describing new bail reform law
and its impact in Connecticut).
105. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Michael Dresser, Maryland Court of Appeals: Defendants
Can’t Be Held in Jail Because They Can’t Afford Bail, BALT. SUN (Feb. 8,
2017), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-bail-rule-20170207
-story.html (discussing a new rule by Maryland’s highest court that is designed
to reduce the use of cash bail).
107. Litigation designed to reform bail practices is either active or recently
resolved in Texas, Louisiana, Illinois, Massachusetts, Georgia, Tennessee, Alabama, California, Oklahoma, Kansas, Mississippi, and Missouri. See Challenging the Money Bail System, C.R. CORPS, http://www.civilrightscorps.org/work/
wealth-based-detention (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Challenging the
Money Bail]; Ending Wealth-Based Pretrial Detention, C.R. CORPS, https://web
.archive.org/web/20170817195205/http://civilrightscorps.org/ending-wealth
-based-pretrial-detention (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Ending
Wealth-Based Pretrial Detention]; see also Ending American Money Bail, EQUAL
JUST. UNDER L., https://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/money-bail-1 (last visited
Oct. 22, 2018).
108. See, e.g., Ending Wealth-Based Pretrial Detention, supra note 107 (describing the cases as ending “unconstitutional wealth-based pretrial detention
policies”); EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER L., supra note 107.
109. ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 227 F. Supp. 3d 706, 706 (S.D. Tex. 2016).
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mately linked with the adoption of actuarial risk assessment instruments.110 While exact details differ across jurisdictions, the
new model generally involves reducing or eliminating the use of
monetary bail and adopting a risk assessment tool to help judges
make decisions about pretrial custody.111 This has resulted in a
rapid proliferation of the use of pretrial risk assessments. The
pretrial risk assessment tool developed by the Arnold Foundation has been adopted by dozens of jurisdictions and three entire
states in the last few years.112 The Harris-Paul bail reform bill
encourages states to replace money bail with pretrial risk assessment.113 States such as New Jersey and New Mexico have revised their constitution to allow for direct orders of detention on
the basis of risk as determined, at least in part, by actuarial risk
assessment.114 Across the country, as a result of changes enacted
by the executive branch, legislature, and the judiciary, jurisdictions are adopting pretrial risk assessment.115
The current wave of bail reform is still in flux. The extent
and exact nature of the changes depends partially on battles that
are being waged in city halls, courthouses, and the court of public
opinion around the country.116 Risk assessments are controversial, and not all agree that they should play a central role in bail
reform.117 Currently, however, risk assessments are a dominant
theme in a rapidly accelerating reform movement.
110. See Mayson, supra note 65, at 492–99 (providing an overview of the recent bail reform movement).
111. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 100, at 5 (listing adoption of risk
assessment as part of bail reform in many jurisdictions).
112. See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., A RE-VALIDATION, supra note 38.
113. See Press Release, Kamala D. Harris, U.S. Senator for Cal., Harris,
Paul Introduce Bill to Encourage States to Reform or Replace Unjust, Costly
Money Bail System (July 20, 2017), https://www.harris.senate.gov/news/press
-releases/harris-paul-introduce-bill-to-encourage-states-to-reform-or-replace
-unjust-costly-money-bail-system.
114. See Matthew Coyte, New Pretrial Risk Assessment More Fair, ALBUQUERQUE J. (June 14, 2017), https://www.abqjournal.com/1017512/new-pretrial
-risk-assessment-more-fair.html (discussing New Mexico’s recent constitutional
changes and the implementation of risk assessment in Albuquerque’s most populous county); see also infra note 231, at 3 (discussing role of risk assessment in
New Jersey’s reforms).
115. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 100, at 10–14.
116. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., John Raphling, Human Rights Watch Advises Against Using
Profile-Based Risk Assessment in Bail Reform, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 17,
2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/17/human-rights-watch-advises
-against-using-profile-based-risk-assessment-bail-reform (arguing against the
use of risk assessment tools in bail reform).
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II. RISK ASSESSMENT: THE SLIM EVIDENCE
This Part provides an overview of the empirical literature
that has influenced expectations about the impacts of risk assessment.118 Section A summarizes research on whether risk assessment algorithms are better at predicting future crime than
judges. Section B discusses the literature on racial bias in risk
assessment. Section C presents some of the reasons why risk assessment in practice may be different than expected. It also discusses the slim evidence on how the use of risk assessment affects outcomes relative to the status quo method of making
decisions.
A. ALGORITHMIC PREDICTION VS. HUMAN INTUITION
The most common argument in support of risk assessment
is that formal, actuarial, and algorithmic methods of prediction
perform better than the intuitive methods used by judges or
other experts.119 Thus, by making smarter decisions about who
to release, jurisdictions could decrease detention rates while
keeping crime and non-appearance rates constant, or vice versa.
The idea that actuarial tools outperform human intuition in predicting crime has become broadly accepted.120 Indeed, there is a
long list of papers claiming to have demonstrated this empirically. A commonly cited meta-analysis, published in 2000, claims
118. This Section does not include studies showing that risk assessments are
effective at predicting criminal activity unless the study compares the predictive
power of risk assessments to the informal predictions of judges or other criminal
justice practitioners.
119. SARAH PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, DEMYSTIFYING RISK ASSESSMENT: KEY PRINCIPLES AND CONTROVERSIES 8 (2017) (“On
balance, actuarial—or data-driven—risk models have tended to outperform the
judgments of individual practitioners, including clinical professionals, in accurately assessing risk. Thus the rationale behind expanding the use of formal
risk assessment tools is that they offer the potential for helping justice agencies
make more informed decisions.”); cf. Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 417, 438–54 (2016) (arguing for adopting risk assessment as a
way to counter a principal-agent problem because by shielding judges from personal responsibility, their actions may closer reflect society’s interests).
120. Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2003) (“Our thesis is straightforward: actuarial
methods have proven equal or superior to clinical judgements.”); Steven L.
Chanenson & Jordan M. Hyatt, The Use of Risk Assessment at Sentencing: Implications for Research and Policy (Villanova Univ. Charles Widger Sch. of Law
Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 2017-1040, 2016) (“[T]here is a
significant literature that suggests that, with regard to accuracy, statistical
methods generally outperform subjective clinical judgments.”).
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that “[o]n average, mechanical [i.e., actuarial and algorithmic]
prediction techniques were about 10% more accurate than clinical [i.e., human] predictions.”121 This meta-analysis includes ten
papers that compare algorithmic to human predictions in the
criminal justice context.122 These papers, however, are dated: All
were published before 1988, and most use small samples and
questionable analytic techniques.123 In addition to the older literature, a number of more recent papers argue that statistical
tools are better at predicting future offending than judges or
magistrates.124 These papers use much larger data sets and more
advanced methodologies than the earlier literature. However,
both the earlier papers and the more recent ones follow a similar
pattern and are susceptible to many of the same critiques.
Proving that algorithms can predict better than human beings is not easy. Ideally, research comparing the two methods of
prediction would be explicitly set up as a horse race between the
two approaches. Both humans and algorithms would make predictions about a particular, well-defined outcome, and a winner
would be declared based on the accuracy of their predictions. Unfortunately, most prior studies comparing different methods of
predicting crime do not follow such an approach. Instead, most
prior papers consist of post-hoc observational analyses that rely
on numerous tenuous assumptions in order to draw inference.
This is best demonstrated by example.
A recently released paper called Human Decisions and Machine Predictions is one of the more carefully executed instances
of the literature and is a good demonstration of its strengths and

121. William M. Grove et al., Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A MetaAnalysis, 12 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 19, 19 (2000).
122. Id. at 22–24.
123. Id. But see Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments
of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 409, 417 (2001) (critiquing analytic techniques relied upon by Grove et al.); see also Starr, supra note 63, at
850–55 (arguing that there is not yet any persuasive evidence that actuarial
instruments outperform judges’ predictions).
124. See, e.g., Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 7, at 553–54 (“Even with
this increase in releases, because we are better targeting which defendants to
release, pretrial violent-crime rates would decrease.”); Kleinberg et al., supra
note 7, at 271 (“We find the algorithm dominates each judge in our data set that
sees a large enough caseload to let us construct a meaningful comparison.”);
Jongbin Jung et al., Simple Rules for Complex Decisions (Apr. 4, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“In nearly every instance, the statistical decision rules outperform the human decision-maker.”).
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limitations.125 This paper uses detailed data on pretrial defendants in New York City to estimate the risk of failing to appear in
court or committing another crime.126 The authors use machinelearning techniques—complex computer-based methods of predicting risk—to build a prediction for each defendant.127 The inputs to the model include criminal history, current offense, and
age as predictors for misconduct (rearrest or nonappearance in
court) among the group of defendants who were released pretrial.128 The authors then conduct a policy simulation in which
they estimate what the crime rate would have been if, instead of
following the status quo procedure, the decision on whether to
release or detain a defendant had been made solely by the machine-learned algorithm.129 They estimate that if the detention
decision was made by their tool that crime could be dramatically
lowered while the detention rate remains constant, or that the
detention rate could be dramatically lowered while the crime
rate remains constant.130
One of the main challenges to determining whether the algorithm outperforms the judges is that the authors do not directly observe the judges’ predictions. They attempt to infer the
predictions by looking at which defendants were detained pretrial.131 There is undoubtedly a connection between the predictions of the judge and the detention status of defendants, but this
connection is noisy and mediated by several other factors. Most
notably, judges are not, by and large, directly determining detention. They are setting bail, and the defendant will be released
if he or she posts bail. The bail amount is not supposed to keep a
defendant detained (although it can be used that way); it is supposed to provide incentive for a released defendant to return to
court. Thus, the judges must predict several unknowns simultaneously: the risk of crime or FTA, the likelihood the defendant
will post a given amount of bail, and the impact that bail will
have on the defendant’s pretrial misconduct. A defendant who
was detained pretrial is not necessarily someone who the judge
considered higher risk than one who was released.
125. Kleinberg et al., supra note 7.
126. Id. at 246.
127. See id. at 252–53 (describing the model).
128. See id. at 239.
129. See id. at 241.
130. See id. at 270–71.
131. See id. at 245–46 (“Judges may be making mistakes in predicting either
crime risk or ability to pay, which may complicate our ability to isolate misprediction of risk.”).
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Second, judges are likely to have more complicated preferences than the algorithm. For one, they may be taking into account factors other than risk. For example, a judge might find it
inappropriate to detain someone on very minor charges, even if
they pose a relatively high statistical risk of future offending.132
Further, there are multiple types of risk that judges consider—
FTA, violent crime, drug crime, etc.—and judges are likely to
vary in the extent to which they are concerned with each. Aggregating multiple judges together means that even if each were
performing optimally according to his or her own preferences, a
risk algorithm could outperform the group average on any single
dimension.
Third, the ability to compare the risk prediction tool to the
judges’ intuition relies on assumptions about the crime risk of
detained defendants. The policy simulation cited in the introduction to this Article—which states that, by adopting risk assessment, the detention rate can be lowered by 41.9% without affecting the crime rate—is based on the assumption that the crime
rate of a detained defendant will be the same as the crime rate
of a released defendant with similar visible characteristics (i.e.,
criminal record, etc.).133 This is almost certainly not true. For
more serious crimes, where release rates are low, the released
defendants will not be at all representative.
These three problems—using an imperfect proxy as a measure for the human’s prediction,134 the implausible assumption
132. Several authors have found some evidence of this. See, e.g., Kleinberg
et al., supra note 7, at 284 (“Judges are most likely to release high-risk people
if their current charge is minor, such as a misdemeanor, and are more likely to
detain low-risk people if their current charge is more serious.”). In fact, it is not
uncommon to find policies that declare a presumption of pretrial release for defendants who are facing relatively low-level charges, and thus would be unlikely
to receive carceral sentences. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.135(1) (West
2012) (declaring that those facing charges for which a conviction may result in
presumptive probation should be released on his or her own recognizance or
unsecured bond); KRASNER, supra note 102 (ending the practice of requesting
cash bond for certain low-level offenses). This is even though research suggests
that the seriousness of the current charge is a relatively poor predictor of future
criminal activity, compared to factors such as prior convictions and age. See
Kristin Bechtel et al., Identifying the Predictors of Pretrial Failure: A MetaAnalysis, 75 FED. PROB. 78, 80–82 (2011) (stating numerous factors, including
age and prior convictions, as being strongly correlated with re-arrest or failure
to appear; however, the current offense itself was not significantly correlated
with re-arrest or failure to appear).
133. See Kleinberg et al., supra note 7, at 271.
134. See, e.g., Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate About Accuracy, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 783, 784 (1994)
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that the human’s objective is exactly the same as the algorithm’s,135 and an inability to measure accuracy because of missing or distorted outcome variables136—are common to most attempts to compare human and algorithmic prediction.137
Kleinberg et al. are aware of these confounds to the research design and make some attempts to address them in their paper.138
They make some headway in providing evidence that the confounds cannot entirely explain away their results. However,
these are not minor issues, but rather fundamental challenges
to the research design. Ultimately, it is unclear how much more
accurate the risk prediction algorithm is, if at all.
In January 2018, an undergraduate computer-studies major
and her advisor published a study that challenged many commonly-held beliefs about the relative accuracy of human intuition and algorithmic predictions.139 Using an experimental
method that was explicitly set up as a horse race between survey
respondents and algorithmic risk assessment models, they found
no evidence that algorithms were more accurate in predicting recidivism than human beings.140 The survey participants were
Mechanical Turk users: random people who were unlikely to
have much criminal justice experience.141 They were given short
(“One commonly used approach [for quantifying decision-maker accuracy in predicting future violence] . . . assumes that clinicians’ recommendations about
hospitalization or release represent judgments about the likelihood of future
violence.”).
135. Kleinberg et al. call this “omitted-payoff bias.” See Kleinberg et al., supra note 7, at 272 (“One potential concern is that when making release decisions, judges might have additional objectives beyond the outcome the algorithm is predicting.”).
136. In observational studies, actions taken to ameliorate risk (i.e., incarceration, supervision, rehabilitative programming, secured bail, etc.) make it hard
to estimate what the risk level would have been in the absence of such interventions. See, e.g., Jongbin Jung et al., Algorithmic Decision Making in the Presence of Unmeasured Confounding (May 4, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with arxiv.org) (“For example, in the judicial context we only observe
whether or not a particular defendant failed to appear at trial given the action
the judge actually took (i.e., requiring bail or not); we do not observe what would
have happened under the alternative judicial action.” (emphasis added)).
137. While a full literature review is beyond the scope of this Article, these
problems can also be found in Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 7, Jung et al.,
supra note 136, and many of the older papers cited in Grove et al., supra note
121.
138. Kleinberg et al., supra note 7, at 273–80.
139. Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting Recidivism, 4 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 1 (2018).
140. Id. at 1.
141. Id.
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descriptions of defendants that contained the following information: sex, age, charge, degree of charge, number of prior convictions, and number of prior juvenile felony and misdemeanor
charges.142 In some versions of the experiment the authors also
provided the defendant’s race.143 The respondents were asked to
predict whether or not the defendant would be rearrested within
two years.144 Since the survey respondent’s payment was five
times greater if their accuracy level was above a certain bar, they
were incentivized to be as accurate as possible.145 Each respondent provided predictions on fifty cases and received real-time
feedback on whether their prediction was correct as well as the
overall accuracy rate.146 The authors compared the accuracy of
the survey respondents against several algorithms: COMPAS, a
prominent risk assessment tool offered by a for-profit company;
a non-linear machine-learning prediction algorithm that the authors developed themselves; and a simple logistic regression prediction tool built off of only two inputs, age and prior convictions.147 The authors found no evidence that any of the
algorithms could outperform the predictions of a random group
of online respondents.148
This study is notable because it is less vulnerable to some of
the confounds listed above. Instead of relying on an imperfect
prediction-proxy, in a setting where the humans may have had
objectives other than risk, this study was designed to elicit specific predictions about a well-defined outcome. This enables a
cleaner accuracy comparison between the survey respondents
and the COMPAS algorithm.
Like any study, one should wait and see if it can be replicated in other contexts and with other data sets before drawing
firm conclusions. And even if the results themselves are internally valid, one cannot infer too much about judges based on a
Mechanical Turk study. The contexts are very different. On the
one hand, one might expect that judges, who are not only experts
but have a lot more information about the case, should be able
to outperform a random online participant who has only seven

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
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data points per defendant. On the other hand, the extra information that judges have may lead them to put too much weight
on extraneous factors, like whether a defendant is sufficiently
polite. Furthermore, judges do not get real-time feedback about
their accuracy. Nonetheless, these results certainly temper the
expectation that algorithms provide a substantial improvement
over human intuition.
Algorithms have proven themselves highly successful in
many contexts—outperforming world masters in chess and Go,
for instance149—so it remains reasonable to think that a wellbuilt actuarial tool can out-predict a judge on future offending.
This is likely to be particularly true in the rapid, assembly-line
style proceedings that characterize many bail hearings. However, the margin of improvement remains unclear.
B. RACIAL DISPARITIES AND RISK ASSESSMENT
The last couple of years have seen increased debate about
whether risk assessment tools will worsen racial disparities in
criminal justice.150 Risk assessment proponents argue that the
objective rankings of a risk tool will be less biased than the subjective evaluations of potentially-racist judges.151 Critics counter
that the risk tools themselves may be racially biased.152 Some of
the confusion lies in a lack of clear language about what constitutes racial bias in risk assessment.153 For the purposes of this
Article, I consider a tool to be racially biased if it systematically
149. See, e.g., Deep Learning Machine Teaches Itself Chess in 72 Hours, Plays
at International Master Level, MIT TECH. REVIEW (Sep. 14, 2015), https://www
.technologyreview.com/s/541276/deep-learning-machine-teaches-itself-chess-in
-72-hours-plays-at-international-master/.
150. For a brief summary of the debate, see Justin Breaux et al., Could Risk
Assessment Contribute to Racial Disparity in the Justice System?, URB. INST.:
URB. WIRE (Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/could-risk
-assessment-contribute-racial-disparity-justice-system (acknowledging the concern that using risk prediction assessment could “exacerbate class and race disparities in the criminal justice system”).
151. See, e.g., Robert D. Hoge, Standardized Instruments for Assessing Risk
and Need in Youthful Offenders, 29 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 380, 387 (2002) (noting the use of standardized risk and need assessment tools would “significantly
reduce the operations of individual biases . . .”).
152. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of
Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 238 (2015) (explaining the tie between race, prior criminal history, and the assessment of risk through risk instruments).
153. Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (noting the various definitions
of bias).
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assigns higher risk scores to defendants from a particular race
than their true risk warrants. (While true risk is hard to define
or measure on the individual level, on the group level it refers to
the average incidence of the predicted outcome.)154 This is how
the term “bias” is used in statistics155 and is similar to the common language usage of the term.156
Using this definition, there are a number of reasons why
risk assessment tools could be biased against blacks.157 The most
common argument is that inputs to risk assessment—prior convictions, prior incarceration sentences, education, employment,
etc.—are themselves the result of racially disparate practices.158
While two defendants may pose a similar crime risk, the defendant living in a heavily-policed minority neighborhood is likely to
have a lengthier criminal record and thus a higher risk score
than one who lives in a less heavily-policed neighborhood.159
Similarly, a risk algorithm that is trained to predict an outcome
that is the result of racially disparate law enforcement or prosecution practices also incorporates bias into the algorithm.160
While these sources of potential bias almost certainly affect the
risk assessment, they are hard to correct for, and few even try.161
154. See, e.g., id. at 10 n.45 (explaining that bias is a “deviation of a statistical calculation” from the “true value” of the item calculated); see also id. at 12
(describing “true positive” as the correct prediction of an arrest).
155. “Systematic error or bias refers to deviations that are not due to chance
alone. The simplest example occurs with a measuring device that is improperly
calibrated so that it consistently overestimates (or underestimates) the measurements by X units.” Penn State Eberly Coll. of Sci., Lesson 4: Bias and Random Error, in STAT 509 DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF CLINICAL TRIALS, https://
onlinecourses.science.psu.edu/stat509/node/26 (last visited Oct. 22, 2018).
156. The online Oxford English Dictionary defines “bias” as “Inclination or
prejudice for or against one person or group, especially in a way considered to
be unfair.” Bias, OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/bias (last visited Oct. 22, 2018).
157. See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate
Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 677–92 (2016) (discussing ways in which data
mining can discriminate).
158. See Breaux et al., supra note 150 (explaining that black probationers
have their probation revoked and are “subsequently incarcerated at much
higher rates” than whites or Hispanics); Harcourt, supra note 152, at 240
(“[R]eliance on criminal history has proven devastating to African American
communities . . . .”).
159. See, e.g., CHRISTIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (acknowledging that
“[r]acial discrimination takes place at every step of the criminal justice system,”
including policing); Breaux et al., supra note 150 (noting that black individuals
are “more likely than whites to be arrested for marijuana use and possession”).
160. See Harcourt, supra note 152, at 238 (“[R]isk today has collapsed into
prior criminal history, and prior criminal history has become a proxy for race.”).
161. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
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Actual rates of offending are unknown and the gap between behavior and criminal record can only be guessed at.
Another place where bias can enter the risk tool is in the
design of the instrument.162 In the simpler, checklist-style instruments the designers choose both the inputs and the weights on
the inputs. If a designer puts more weight on inputs that correlate with race than their crime-predictiveness warrants, the tool
will be biased. In machine-learned risk assessment tools this
type of bias is less of a concern. The weight the algorithm places
on different inputs will generally reflect only the extent to which
these inputs are predictive of what it is trained to predict.
Empirical research on racial bias in risk assessment is both
thin and recent. In 2016, ProPublica released a study that
claimed to have found evidence that a proprietary risk assessment tool called COMPAS, used to help make decisions about
pretrial release in Broward County, Florida, was biased against
black defendants.163 To support this claim, they show that “black
defendants who did not recidivate over a two-year period were
nearly twice as likely to be misclassified as higher risk compared
to their white counterparts. . . .”164 In technical terms, this is a
disparity in false positive rates, or the fraction of non-recidivating defendants who were ranked as high risk.165 Many researchers countered this argument with the point that disparate false
positive rates will be present every time there are disparate
rates of offending—and thus disparate average risk levels—
across groups.166 The intuition behind this is simple. A false positive rate is a ratio: the denominator is the total number of people
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal
-sententcing (noting that the sentencing commission did not carry out risk score
studies after a warning from the U. S. Attorney General that the risk scores
may be biased).
162. See id. (explaining that, even after running statistical tests that “isolated the effect of race from criminal history and recidivism, as well as from
defendant’s age and gender,” black defendants were still seventy-seven percent
“more likely to be pegged as at higher risk of committing a future violent
crime”).
163. Id. (“There’s software used across the country to predict future criminals. And it’s biased against blacks.”).
164. Julia Angwin et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we
-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm.
165. See Mayson, supra note 153 (explaining, briefly, the mechanics of a
“false positive”).
166. See, e.g., William Dieterich et al., COMPAS Risk Scales: Demonstrating
Accuracy Equity and Predictive Parity, NORTHPOINTE, at 1, 8 (July 8, 2016),
https://university.pretrial.org/viewdocument/compas-risk-scales
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who do not recidivate and the numerator is the number of people
who do not recidivate but are classified as high risk. As the risk
level of a group increases, there will be fewer people who do not
recidivate and more people who are labeled high risk.167 Since
there are fewer non-recidivists, the denominator will decrease.
Since there are more people labeled “high risk”—some fraction
of which do not recidivate—the numerator increases. Thus, in
simple mathematical terms, as the risk level goes up, the false
positive rate will go up too. In other words, differing levels of
offending will lead to disparate false positive rates even if we
knew the true risk of each group and even if the tool is completely
unbiased.168 In fact, when there are disparate base rates of offending, one would have to program a risk tool to be biased (so
that one group systematically gets a lower or higher risk classification than their true risk level warrants) in order to eradicate
disparate false positive rates.169
While ProPublica framed this as being about actuarial risk
assessment,170 it is actually relevant to the entire project of using
risk to make decisions in criminal justice. The key points apply
equally regardless of how the risk evaluation was conducted:
through proprietary black box risk assessment tools, transparent checklist instruments, or judges’ intuitive assessment of
risk. If it is concerning that black defendants who do not recidivate are more likely to be labeled high risk than white defendants who do not recidivate (and there are plenty of reasons why
-demonstrating-a (explaining that the false positive rates are a “natural consequence of using unbiased scoring rules”); Jennifer L. Doleac & Megan Stevenson, Are Criminal Risk Assessment Scores Racist?, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 22,
2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2016/08/22/are-criminal-risk
-assessment-scores-racist (“Disparate false-positive rates will be present every
time there are disparate rates of reoffending . . . .”).
167. See Doleac & Stevenson, supra note 166 (explaining, briefly, the equation of the “false positive”).
168. While disparate impact is not inherently unfair, it can be unfair when
the costs are born by a marginalized group and the benefits accrue to the dominant group. The unfairness arises not from the disparate impact per se, but
from the presumption that the benefits to the dominant group were given disproportionate weight in the policy decision, while the costs to the marginalized
group were discounted.
169. See Jon Kleinberg et al., Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination
of Risk Scores, ARXIV (Nov. 17, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807.pdf
(showing that, except for in very specialized circumstances, achieving equal
false positive rates would require a risk tool where the same risk classification
would correspond with different levels of actual risk across the two groups).
170. See generally Angwin et al., supra note 164 (explaining the ProPublica
study on risk assessment).
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this should be concerning!), then this calls into question the entire regime of using risk as a basis of restricting liberties, not
simply actuarial risk assessment instruments.
Disparate false positive rates are not a measure of racial
bias under the definition used in this Article. Most other researchers do not measure racial bias using disparate false positive rates either.171 Instead, they measure bias using predictive
parity: similar recidivism rates among white and black defendants with the same risk score.172 If a risk score is racially biased
using the definition provided above, then the likelihood of committing crime would be lower for black defendants than it would
be for white defendants with the same risk score. The company
that owns COMPAS responded to ProPublica’s article by showing that there is no evidence that the tool is biased using predictive parity tests.173 Similar results have been found for the Post
Conviction Risk Assessment (PCRA) in a detailed study of racial
disparities and risk assessment.174 The PSA likewise shows predictive parity for white and black defendants,175 as does the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI).176

171. See Jennifer L. Skeem & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, and
Recidivism: Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 685
(2016) (“There is substantial agreement on the empirical criteria that indicate
when a test is . . . biased . . . the paramount indicator of test bias is predictive
bias . . . .”).
172. See generally Dietrich et al., supra note 166, at 9 (explaining predictive
parity in relation to risk score).
173. Id. at 2–3 (noting that if the “correct classifications statistics are used,”
then claims of racial bias are “not supported”).
174. Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 171, at 690 (stating that test findings
were “generally consistent” with the hypothesis that there would be “little evidence that the accuracy of the PCRA in predicting rearrest depends on whether
offenders are Black or White”).
175. See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., RESULTS FROM THE FIRST SIX
MONTHS OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT – COURT KENTUCKY 1, 4 (2014),
https://arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/PSA-Court-Kentucky
-6-Month-Report.pdf [hereinafter FIRST SIX MONTHS]. This study has been recently removed from the Arnold Foundation’s website but is on file with the
author. Representatives of the Arnold Foundation explained that it was removed due to concerns about the quality of the data used in the report.
176. See Mona J.E. Danner et al., Race and Gender Neutral Pretrial Risk
Assessment, Release Recommendations, and Supervision: VPRAI and Praxis Revised, LUMINOSITY, at 1, 8, https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/
files/publications/corrections/race-and-gender-neutral-pretrial-risk-assessment
-release-recommendations-and-supervision.pdf (“Taken as a whole, the analyses support the neutrality of the VPRAI in classifying People of Color and
Whites by risk of pretrial failure.”).
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However, there are reasons to question the predictive parity
approach. First, it is impossible to test for predictive parity in
rates of reoffending; one can only test for predictive parity in
something visible, like arrest or conviction. Given the differences
in how different neighborhoods are policed—as well as the many
other opportunities for racial bias or racial disparity to affect the
likelihood of arrest or conviction—a group of black defendants
who are rearrested at the same rate as a group of white defendants may have committed fewer crimes.177 The race gap between
the rate of offense and rate of rearrest is thought to be lower for
violent crimes than for less serious crimes.178 The Skeem & Lowenkamp study on racial bias in the PCRA focuses primarily on
predictive parity for violent crime rearrest for this express reason.179
A second concern with using predictive parity as a measure
is that the rate of reoffending does not directly measure the risk
of reoffending at the time the risk was evaluated.180 Actual
reoffending is a joint combination of a person’s propensity to
commit crime and the opportunities and incentives that she
faces.181 Risk evaluations, both formal and informal, influence
these opportunities and incentives.182 In particular, they influence the likelihood that a defendant will be incarcerated, supervised, provided treatment, and so forth.183 If judges treat black
defendants differently than white defendants this would bias
measures of predictive parity. For example, if judges are more
177. See Breaux et al., supra note 150 (noting that black individuals are
“more likely than whites to be arrested for marijuana use and possession,” despite similar rates of use).
178. See, e.g., Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 171, at 690 (noting that “violent arrests” are “the most unbiased criterion available” since they involve less
police discretion than do “victimless” crimes).
179. Id. at 690 (describing why they chose risk of violent crime as the main
focus of their analysis).
180. See Doleac & Stevenson, supra note 166 (“Recidivism rates do not tell
us what a person’s propensity to commit another crime was at the time the risk
score was calculated.”).
181. See Shawn Bushway & Jeffrey Smith, Sentencing Using Statistical
Treatment Rules: What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Us, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 377, 378 (2007) (“[I]t is impossible without additional strong assumptions to distinguish the ‘true’ behavior of individual offenders from the behavior
that results from their non-random treatment within the existing system.”).
182. See id. (explaining that “judges, prosecutors, parole boards and other
actors in the criminal justice system” use the “information available to them,”
formal or informal, to “assign punishments”).
183. See id.; see also Doleac & Stevenson, supra note 166 (noting that “risk
scores influence sentencing, and sentencing influences recidivism”).
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likely to assign white defendants to enter an effective drug treatment program, their rate of reoffending will be lower than black
defendants who were less likely to be assigned to the effective
program.184
Determining whether a risk tool is racially biased is probably redundant. As Princeton computer scientist Aylin Caliskan
says, “[M]achines are trained on human data. And humans are
biased.”185 The important question is whether the use of actuarial risk assessment tools results in more disparate outcomes
than the status quo, or other viable alternatives. Outside of the
research presented in this study, the empirical research on this
is next to non-existent.186
C. RESEARCH ON THE IMPACTS OF RISK ASSESSMENT
The discourse around risk assessment has focused primarily
on the tools themselves.187 But risk assessments are merely
tools, and their impact will depend on how they are used. A variety of contextual and policy details are influential: the amount
of judicial discretion allowed, the judge’s incentive structure, the
fraction of defendants in each risk classification, the specific action-directives associated with each risk classification, the court
culture, etc.188 Even if risk assessments are racially biased, their
use may result in lower racial disparities than the status quo.

184. See Doleac & Stevenson, supra note 166 (discussing the interplay between risk score and court sentencing).
185. Brian Resnick, How Artificial Intelligence Learns to Be Racist, VOX
(Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/4/17/15322378/
how-artificial-intelligence-learns-how-to-be-racist.
186. See THE JUSTICE POLICY INST., REDUCING DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT: THE MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON SUCCESS STORY AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS (2002), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/
documents/multnomah.pdf (outlining the only study that the author is aware of
that could even tentatively be taken as evidence on how risk assessment in practice affects racial disparities relative to the status quo).
187. This is starting to change. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & John Monahan, Judging Risk (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2018–44), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=3190403 (proposing a regulatory framework for the use of risk
assessment); Koepke & Robinson, supra note 86 (highlighting the importance of
the decision-making framework around risk assessments).
188. See, e.g., Joel Miller & Carrie Maloney, Practitioner Compliance with
Risk/Needs Assessment Tools: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment, 40
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 716, 719 (2003) (explaining how practitioners may not
complete the risk assessment tools, may carelessly use the tools, manipulate the
tools, or not adhere to tool recommendations).
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Even if risk assessment tools are significantly better than humans at predicting future offending, that does not automatically
mean that their adoption will lead to large benefits.
Risk assessments are usually used as a supplement to human discretion; judges or other criminal justice authorities retain wide latitude to make the final decision.189 Discretion is justified in principle because the individual facts of a case may
make a defendant higher or lower risk than her risk score indicates.190 Ideally, discretion is used only to correct a mistaken risk
evaluation. In practice, however, it may be hard to identify when
individual factors are influential enough to render the risk assessment score incorrect. Judges may ignore the risk tool in
cases where it is correct, or place too much credence on it when
it is incorrect.191 The evidence suggests that judges and criminal
justice practitioners do not have a lot of faith in risk assessment
tools. In a recent survey of judicial attitudes toward risk assessment at sentencing, less than 10% thought that the actuarial
tools would predict better than judges.192 A survey of more than
two thousand probation and parole officers found that even
among the most compliant officers, “practitioners routinely exercise substantial discretion to choose interventions that are
more restrictive or intensive than the tool recommends.”193 With
such low confidence and adherence, risk assessment may only
change behavior in exceptional circumstances. Are these circumstances in which the tool provides significant informational gain
over human intuition? If not, then the tool will provide little benefit in practice.
Expanding upon this theme, judges may use the risk assessment tools differently for white defendants than they do for black
defendants.194 A judge may think a black defendant is higher risk
189. See, e.g., Garrett & Monahan, supra note 187, at 7 (“[T]he process [of
adopting risk assessment] has often been ad hoc and involves conveying risk
information to judges and other decisionmakers, who retain traditional discretion.”).
190. See id. at 13–14 (noting the concern that certain individual factors, such
as how common or uncommon the offense and time at which the offense was
committed, could lead to inaccurate predictions by risk assessment instruments).
191. See id. at 19–20 (describing the instances when judges could have assigned alternative sentences to those categorized as “least violent offenders” but
opted not to).
192. See Chanenson & Hyatt, supra note 120, at 10.
193. Miller & Maloney, supra note 188, at 728.
194. See, e.g., Hannah-Moffat, supra note 79, at 280 (“[R]ace and ethnicity
can influence practitioners’ attribution of risk factors to offenders . . . .”).
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than their risk score indicates because of racist stereotypes. Alternatively, she may think a black defendant is lower risk than
is indicated by the risk score because she is aware that racially
disparate policing practices contributed to his previous arrests.
While the question of racial disparity is often posed as a choice
between biased instruments or biased judges, in practice, the important question is “how do the two interact?”
The way the criminal justice administrator (judge, parole
board member, etc.) uses a risk tool is not just an idiosyncratic
function of her personality—it is likely to be influenced by the
institutional background and her incentive structure.195 Someone who is elected will be attuned to the concerns of re-election
and may be wary of taking actions that would lead to a loss of
political support. Someone who is appointed is likely to have concerns about re-appointment, and will take efforts to please the
appointing body. These career concerns will play out differently
if there is transparency and accountability in the way the tool is
used. If there is little oversight, the judge will be more likely to
follow her own sensibility.196
The impacts of risk assessment depend also on numerous
policy decisions. First, the jurisdiction must choose whether to
report actual statistical risk, (i.e., a defendant has an x percent
chance of y happening within z months) or risk labeling (i.e., low,
moderate, or high).197 Most jurisdictions use a risk labeling approach.198 This approach requires defining the cutoffs in statistic
risk that determine each classification.199 In other words, it requires a normative decision about what fraction of defendants
should receive the stigmatic high-risk label versus more the benign low-risk label.200 These risk labels then translate, either explicitly or implicitly, into action-directives. Many jurisdictions
195. See generally Miller & Maloney, supra note 188, at 720 (describing reasons for practitioner noncompliance with risk assessment tools, including the
desire to “obtain a desirable outcome, or avoid an adverse one”).
196. See generally Hannah-Moffat, supra note 79, at 285–86 (discussing
transparency in the use of a risk instrument).
197. See Daniel A. Kraus et al., Risk Assessment Communication Difficulties:
An Empirical Examination of the Effects of Categorical Versus Probabilistic
Risk Communication in Sexually Violent Predator Decisions, BEHAV. SCI. & L.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author) (explaining categorical and numerical-based predictive probabilities).
198. See id. (manuscript at 4) (noting that judges seem to prefer categorical
over numeric-based estimates).
199. See id. (manuscript at 6) (describing the range of categories in risk labeling).
200. See id.
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implement specific schemas for how defendants in different risk
classifications are to be treated. For instance, it is common in the
pretrial context to direct judges to grant non-financial release for
low-risk defendants, conditional release (with supervision or low
cash bond) for moderate-risk defendants, and detention for high
risk defendants.201 Even if the policy is not explicit about what
actions should be taken with each group, there may still be implicit recommendations.202 High-risk defendants should be
treated as high-risk defendants are supposed to be treated in
that particular jurisdiction; usually this entails greater restrictions on liberty.203 A jurisdiction must decide whether the
decision-maker has full discretion when it comes to following the
action-directives, or whether certain actions are banned/required based on the risk score.204 It must decide whether to impose any costs, in terms of time, convenience, or otherwise, of
deviating from the action-directive. Finally, a jurisdiction must
decide what degree of transparency and accountability to require
in the use of risk assessment tools.205
An evaluation of the impacts of risk assessment in practice
will always be a joint evaluation of the tool itself, the manner in
which it is used, and the policy structure it is embedded in. Such
evaluations are very scarce. Outside of the results reported in
this Article, I am aware of only two rigorous, third party studies
that compare outcomes when a risk assessment tool is being
used to outcomes under the status quo method of making decisions. A study by Richard Berk showed that parole board members in Pennsylvania did not change their release decisions very
much when risk assessments were available.206 Berk found tentative evidence that the risk assessment tool lowered recidivism
201. See, e.g., SENTENCING PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A MANUAL FOR PRACTITIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS
1, 31 (2008), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/
Reducing-Racial-Disparity-in-the-Criminal-Justice-System-A-Manual-for
-Practitioners-and-Policymakers.pdf (describing the pretrial risk scale that was
used in Minnesota’s Fourth Judicial District, which called for variated release
conditions based on level of risk).
202. See, e.g., Miller & Maloney, supra note 188, at 720 (explaining how some
policies may allow practitioner override of the tool recommendation).
203. See, e.g., Angwin et al., supra note 161 (noting that risk scores can decide bond amounts to more “fundamental decisions about defendants’ freedom”).
204. See, e.g., Chanenson & Hyatt, supra note 120, at 4 (pointing out the
possibility of practitioner discretion over using the risk results).
205. See id. at 6 (noting that individual jurisdictions oft evaluate possible
levels of transparency when deciding if to implement a risk-assessment tool).
206. Berk, supra note 11, at 203 tbl.2.
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rates, but cautioned against firm conclusions due to weakness in
the research design.207 A different paper by Berk and coauthors
used a large randomized control trial to evaluate different methods of assigning convicts to prison.208 Inmates in the treatment
group were assigned to prisons by the machine learning risk assessment tool: higher-risk defendants were assigned to highersecurity prisons.209 In the control group, inmates were assigned
to prisons using the existing scoring system.210 There was no decrease in inmate misconduct for defendants who were assigned
to facilities using the risk assessment tool,211 but the misconduct
was shifted toward higher-security facilities, suggesting that the
tool was effective in predicting misconduct.212 The little evidence
that is available about the impacts of pretrial risk assessment in
particular come from detail-light, non-academic reports usually
put out by the organization who designed or implemented the
tool. Two of the most commonly cited reports use data from Kentucky.213 One is a report put out by Kentucky Pretrial Services
207. See id. at 213 (noting that rearrests “look to have declined” after “forecasts and reliabilities were regularly made available,” but that the treatment
affect estimates may have been inflated due to practice changes when the learning forecasts and reliabilities were introduced).
208. Richard A. Berk et al., A Randomized Experiment Testing Inmate Classification Systems, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 215, 216 (2003).
209. See id. at 219 (explaining that a goal of the new classification system
was to “better predict inmate misconduct and place them accordingly”).
210. See id. at 216 (explaining the scoring system in place by the Center for
Disease Control).
211. See id. at 232–33 (noting that there lacked “any important differences
in misconduct” between the experimental and control groups).
212. Id. at 233 (“[T]he new system shifted the misconduct into the higher
security levels . . . .”). This study is better thought of as an evaluation of supervision levels than an evaluation of risk assessment, since it does not compare
decision making with risk assessment against the status quo decision-making
method. Virginia is also cited as an example of successful use of risk assessment
in sentencing, but the studies cited to support this claim also do not compare
decision making with and without risk assessment and thus cannot demonstrate whether risk assessment brought any improvement. See BRIAN J.
OSTROM ET AL., OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA: A THREE-STAGE
EVALUATION 15 (2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/196815.pdf;
Mathew Kleiman et al., Using Risk Assessment to Inform Sentencing Decisions
for Nonviolent Offenders in Virginia, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 106, 112 (2007).
213. A third study also analyzes HB 463, but relies heavily on data from
Kentucky Pretrial Services. JOHN D. MINTON, JR. ET AL., REPORT ON IMPACT OF
HOUSE BILL 463: OUTCOMES, CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (2012).
This study argues that judicial discretion has undermined the effectiveness of
HB 463. See also Robert Veldman, Pretrial Detention in Kentucky: An Analysis
of the Impact of House Bill 463 During the First Two Years of Its Implementation, 102 KY. L. J. 777, 778 (2013) (“To improve the bill’s effectiveness and keep
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evaluating HB 463.214 Another is a report put out by the Laura
& John Arnold Foundation evaluating the adoption of their risk
assessment tool, the PSA.215
Both reports are brief and show simply that the average detention and pretrial rearrest rates are lower in the period after
the risk assessment change than they were in the period before.216 (The Kentucky Pretrial Services report also claims that
FTA rates were lowered.217) While these findings are often cited
as evidence that risk assessment can jointly decrease both detention rates and crime, the articles provide little evidence that
the changes cited come from the risk assessment. For instance,
it is possible that there was a steady decline in both detention
rates and rearrest that started long before the period of analysis
and had nothing to do with risk assessment. However, there is a
more fundamental reason why the statistics presented in these
reports cannot be interpreted as an evaluation of risk assessment. Both reports were published very soon after the change
they are analyzing and before all the cases in the sample were
resolved.218 The analysts do not correct for the fact that defendants whose cases were not yet resolved had, on average, less time
with the legislative intent, judicial discretion should be curtailed to prevent the
dominance of subjective decision making.”).
214. MINTON ET AL., supra note 213.
215. FIRST SIX MONTHS, supra note 175, at 1. This study has recently been
removed from the Arnold Foundation’s website but is on file with the author.
Representatives of the Arnold Foundation explained that it was removed due to
concerns about the quality of the data used in the report. Research Report: Results from the First Six Months of the Public Safety Assessment – Court in Kentucky, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www
.arnoldfoundation.org/research-report-results-first-six-months-public-safetyassessment-court-kentucky.
216. MARK HEYERLEY, KY. PRETRIAL SERVS., PRETRIAL REFORM IN KENTUCKY 6 (2013), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/
DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=95c0fae5-fe2e-72e0-15a2
-84ed28155d0a; FIRST SIX MONTHS, supra note 215, at 1.
217. HEYERLEY, supra note 216, at 6.
218. The publication date of HEYERLEY, supra note 216 is June 2012. The
post–HB 463 period is the year from June 2011–June 2012. HEYERLEY, supra
note 216, at 6. Thus, the post–HB 463 period includes many cases which have
not yet been adjudicated. The publication date of FIRST SIX MONTHS, supra note
175 is July 2014. The post-PSA period extends from July–December 2013 while
the comparison group includes cases from July 2009–July 2013. FIRST SIX
MONTHS, supra note 175, at 1. Only 83% of the released defendants whose cases
originated in the six-month post-PSA period were resolved by the date of the
Arnold publication, compared with 97% of the pre-PSA cases. The report contains a footnote acknowledging that pretrial rearrest rates may rise since some
cases remain open. In fact, the fraction of released defendants who were arrested pretrial rose an additional 2.5% since the publication of the report,
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in which to be rearrested than defendants whose original arrest
occurred earlier.219 This artificially deflates the rearrest rate for
defendants whose arrest occurred after the adoption of the risk
assessment. In statistical terms, this is called “truncation bias,”
and it erroneously made it appear like risk assessment led to
lower instances of misconduct.220 Part IV of this Article provides
evidence that neither the 2011 law nor the adoption of the PSA
led to a lower rate of pretrial rearrest or FTA.221
It is not uncommon to find statistics from other jurisdictions
cited as evidence that pretrial risk assessment led to a decrease
in detention rates, FTAs, and crime, but the research supporting
these claims are as tenuous—or more so—than the studies cited
above. The Arnold Foundation released a report stating that the
use of their risk assessment tool in Lucas County, Ohio, led to a
doubling in the number of defendants granted non-financial release and a decrease in pretrial rearrest and FTA, but the onepage press release contains little detail besides that.222 A court
document shows that the pretrial detention rate actually increased in Lucas County after risk assessment was adopted.223
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina is also supposed to have
seen a dramatic drop in their jail population after adopting the
demonstrating that the PSA did not lead to a reduction in pretrial crime. For a
discussion of the increase in pretrial arrests, see infra note 292 and accompanying text.
219. External pressures forced a rapid release of this report despite significant concerns about the data that were expressed by the head of Kentucky Pretrial Services. Telephone Interview with Tara Boh Blair, Chief Operations Officer, Ky. Pretrial Servs. (May 15, 2017).
220. The same error is responsible for the erroneous conclusion in HEYERLEY, supra note 216, at 6 that rates of non-appearance were lower after HB 463
than before. The Arnold Foundation report acknowledges in a footnote that the
post-PSA rearrest and non-appearance rates may rise since some cases remained open. FIRST SIX MONTHS, supra note 175, at 2 n.2. However, in conversations with them, they expressed the opinion that the differences in results are
mostly due to differences in how the data were pulled and processed.
221. The Arnold Foundation also released a report stating that non-financial
release is up, and crime and FTAs are down in Lucas County, Ohio after implementing the PSA. See New Data: Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool Works to Reduce
Crime, Increase Court Appearances, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. (Aug. 8,
2016), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/new-data-pretrial-risk-assessment
-tool-works-reduce-crime-increase-court-appearances [hereinafter LAURA &
JOHN ARNOLD FOUND, New Data]. There are not enough details in the report to
assess these claims. See id.
222. See id.
223. Notice of Filing Copy of Presentation Assessing Impact of Public Safety
Assessment at 12 app., Jones v. Wittenberg, No. 3:70CV388, 2017 WL 1422345
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2017), https://thecrimereport.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/
08/Lucas-County-court-filing.pdf.
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Arnold Foundation’s risk assessment, but the evidence purporting to support this consists entirely of slides taken from two PowerPoint presentations.224 Multnomah County, Oregon is cited as
a successful example of risk assessment leading not only to lower
detention rates among juveniles, but also lower racial disparities
in detention.225 However, the authors of the study do not attribute the change to risk assessment per se.226 A study in Virginia
states that training pretrial officers in how to use a risk assessment tool led to increased release recommendations, increased
release, and lower misconduct.227 The study claims that agencies
were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, which
suggests that it may be more rigorous than previous research.228
However, the study was conducted by the same company that
designed the risk tool (raising conflict of interest concerns) and
did not provide enough detail to verify the reliability of the research design.229

224. Both CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 21 and
JESSICA EAGLIN & DANYELLE SOLOMON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REDUCING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN JAILS 28 (2015), https://www
.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Racial%20Disparities%20
Report%20062515.pdf state that risk assessment led to a drop in incarceration
in Mecklenburg County, but PowerPoint slides are the only references cited in
these papers that directly support this claim. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY
PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 37 n.182; EAGLIN & SOLOMON, supra, at 52 n.91.
225. VINCENT SCHIRALDI & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INST., REDUCING DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT: THE MULTNOMAH
COUNTY, OREGON SUCCESS STORY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 13–14 (2002), http://
www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/multnomah.pdf.
226. Id. at 15–16 (“It is difficult to assess what any one detention reform
strategy (alternatives to incarceration, objective risk assessments, expedited
case processing, sanctions grid for VOPs) or explicit DMC reduction strategy
(diversity training, additional public defender resources, staff diversification,
data collection and research, new coalitions with other agencies and groups, diversification of the delivery system) made the difference in Multnomah.”).
227. MONA J.E. DANNER ET AL., LUMINOSITY, INC., RISK-BASED PRETRIAL
RELEASE RECOMMENDATION AND SUPERVISION GUIDELINES 1–2 (2015), https://
www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/corrections/risk
-based-pretrial-release-recommendation-and-supervision-guidelines.pdf.
228. There were twenty-nine agencies randomized. Id. at 4. Presumably
these agencies varied in size and were associated with different regions and regional practices. A typical RCT where randomization was conducted over a
small number of groups would show evidence about the extent to which outcomes differed across treatment and control groups before the experimental intervention occurred. If the outcomes differed across treatment and control before the intervention, then post-intervention differences in outcomes cannot be
attributed to the intervention.
229. See DANNER ET AL., supra note 227, at 3–4.
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New Jersey has recently implemented dramatic reform to
its pretrial system.230 They shifted from a traditional money bail
system to one in which detention is only authorized after a thorough hearing with evidence, discovery, and counsel present.231
Risk assessment is used to help determine the level of pretrial
supervision and to suggest candidates for pretrial custody.232
New Jersey has seen a dramatic decline in the rates of pretrial
detention since bail reform was implemented.233 The impact on
pretrial crime and FTAs is still unknown.234
In sum, there is a sore lack of research on the impacts of risk
assessment in practice. There is no evidence on how the use of
risk assessment affects racial disparities. There is no evidence
that the adoption of risk assessment has led to dramatic improvements in either incarceration rates or crime without adversely affecting the other margin. The research on whether it
should theoretically (due to improvements in predictive accuracy) is far from definitive. Nonetheless, it is a broadly held belief that the adoption of risk assessment tools will lead to clear
improvements in the efficiency of criminal justice.235
III. THE IMPACTS OF PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN
KENTUCKY
This Part provides some of the first rigorous empirical evidence on the impacts of pretrial risk assessment in practice. It
provides important information about risk assessment’s effects
230. Hon. Glenn A. Grant, Acting Administrative Director of the Courts, Remarks Before the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee 2 (May 4,
2017).
231. Id. at 3.
232. Id. at 3–4.
233. Joe Hernandez, N.J.’s Jail Population Dropped 10 Percent in Two
Months After It Scrapped Cash Bail, WHYY (Mar. 13, 2017), https://whyy.org/
articles/njs-jail-population-dropped-10-percent-in-two-months-after-it
-scrapped-cash-bail.
234. See id.
235. See, e.g., PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 119, at 22 (“[T]here is a
growing professional consensus that the careful and ethical implementation of
risk assessment tools can facilitate improved criminal justice outcomes.”); Anne
Milgram et al., Pretrial Risk Assessment: Improving Public Safety and Fairness
in Pretrial Decision Making, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 216, 219 (2015) (“[J]udges’ use
of [risk assessment] instruments has helped them make pretrial release decisions that have reduced pretrial crime, kept dangerous offenders off our streets,
and reduced the number of low-risk defendants detained before trial.”); Skeem
& Lowenkamp, supra note 171, at 680 (“One way to begin unwinding mass incarceration without compromising public safety is to use risk assessment instruments in sentencing and corrections.”).
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in a state that has been held up as a leader in pretrial reform, as
well as insight about a risk assessment tool that has been widely
adopted in other jurisdictions. It also serves as an empirical case
study through which to explore, as is done in Part IV, the myriad
ways that the impacts of risk assessment in practice may be different, and more complicated, than previously thought. Such differences underline the importance of constantly evaluating new
methods: a habit that is too rarely present in criminal justice
despite the lip service paid to evidence-based practices.
A. OVERVIEW OF PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN KENTUCKY
Kentucky is noted as an early adopter of pretrial risk assessment tools and is often cited as an example for other jurisdictions
to follow.236 California’s bail reform efforts have been modeled
after Kentucky’s system.237 An amicus brief signed by sixtyseven current and former district and state’s attorneys, as well
as other high-ranking criminal justice officials, described Kentucky’s use of pretrial risk assessment as “impressive” and “very
effective.”238 The Arnold Foundation’s risk tool, the PSA, was developed and piloted in Kentucky.239 It has since been adopted in
forty jurisdictions including three entire states, three of the largest cities, and two of the largest jail systems.240
Kentucky has had an innovative pretrial system for many
years. It is known as one of only four states that have outlawed
the commercial bail industry.241 It has used some sort of risk assessment instrument since 1976.242 Whereas most states either
lack pretrial services or have locally-organized agencies in only
the largest cities, Kentucky’s pretrial services operate
statewide.243 They have earned both national and local respect
236. See supra note 18 (demonstrating that Kentucky’s use of pretrial risk
assessments is an example for other jurisdictions).
237. Young, supra note 19.
238. See Brief of Current and Former District and State’s Attorneys, State’
Attorneys General, United States Attorneys, Assistant United States Attorneys, and Department of Justice Officials as Amici Curiae supporting PlaintiffsAppellees at 9, 10 n.8, ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 227 F. Supp. 3d 706 (S.D. Tex.
2016) (No. H-16-1414), aff ’ d in part, rev’d in part, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018).
239. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., New Data, supra note 221, at 3, 5.
240. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
241. JUSTICE POLICY INST., FOR BETTER OR FOR PROFIT: HOW THE BAIL
BONDING INDUSTRY STANDS IN THE WAY OF FAIR AND EFFECTIVE PRETRIAL JUSTICE 40 (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/_
for_better_or_for_profit_.pdf.
242. HEYERLEY, supra note 216, at 10.
243. Id. at 3.
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for their adoption of evidence-based practices, their low FTA and
pretrial crime rates, and their rigorous data collection.244
In 2011, Kentucky passed a major criminal justice reform
bill: House Bill 463.245 As far as pretrial issues are concerned,
the “most significant advancement [of HB 463] is the mandatory
use of a ‘research-based, validated assessment tool’ to measure a
defendant’s risk of flight or of posing a risk to the public.”246 Before HB 463, use of the pretrial risk assessment tool was optional.247 Judges who were not interested in the tool were not
required to look at it, and many did not use it at all.248 HB 463
made consideration of the risk assessment a mandatory part of
determining bond.249 It delineated a specific action-directive for
low- and moderate-risk defendants: immediate release without
cash bail.250 Defendants were granted a $100-per-day credit toward the bail amount for each day they spend in jail,251 the bail
amount was capped at the maximum fine for crimes that were
punishable by fine only,252 and nonmonetary release was recommended for defendants charged with crimes where the presumptive punishment is probation.253 However, nowhere in HB 463
was judicial discretion limited. In a Kentucky Supreme Court
order that clarified how judges should respond to HB 463, this

244. See Jamie Neal, State Pretrial Services Leader Receives 2012 Public Advocate Award, KY. CT. JUST. (Oct. 2, 2012) http://courts.ky.gov/pages/newsroom
.aspx?viewMode=PressRelease&pressReleaseGUID=%7BD15D83C0-10F7
-4E92-9CB1-A775C14F2DCC%7D. The head of Kentucky Pretrial Services received Kentucky’s 2012 Public Advocate Award for her work promoting pretrial
justice. Id.
245. Public Safety and Offender Accountability Act, ch. 2, 2011 Ky. Acts 5.
246. Damon Preston, Changes in Criminal Law or Criminal Procedure in
HB 463, in CRIMINAL LAW REFORM: THE FIRST YEAR OF HB 463, at 5 (2012),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.kybar.org/resource/resmgr/2012_Convention_
Files/ac2012_2.pdf.
247. Telephone Interview with Tara Boh Blair, Chief Operations Officer, Ky.
Pretrial Servs. (May 15, 2017).
248. Id.
249. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066(2) (West 2018) (“In making [the pretrial
release and bail] determination, the court shall consider the pretrial risk assessment . . . .”).
250. Id. § 431.066(3)–(4).
251. Id. § 431.066(5)(a).
252. Id. § 431.525(2).
253. Id. § 218A.135(1).
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was made abundantly clear, stating, “Nothing in these guidelines shall be construed to limit the court’s discretion as to
whether or not to grant pretrial release to a defendant.”254
When the Kentucky Legislature passed HB 463, Kentucky
used a risk assessment algorithm that was developed internally
by their pretrial services agency.255 Like most pretrial risk assessment tools in use,256 it was a checklist-style instrument that
put heavy weight on criminal history and prior FTAs.257 It also
included several non-criminal justice inputs, such as whether
the defendant had stable employment, housing, and a reference
willing to attend court or co-sign the bond.258 It was validated
(i.e., shown to be predictive of pretrial rearrest and FTA) in a
2010 study conducted by the JFA Institute.259
In July of 2013, Kentucky adopted a new risk assessment
tool: the Public Safety Assessment (PSA).260 This tool was developed by the Arnold Foundation using both Kentucky data and a
large dataset on pretrial releases in more than 300 jurisdictions.261 The PSA evaluates risk along three dimensions: risk of
FTA, risk of new arrest, and risk of new arrest for a violent

254. ORDER APPROVING JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE AND
MONITORED RELEASE § 11 (Ky. 2011), http://courts.ky.gov/courts/supreme/
Rules_Procedures/201112.pdf. In addition to changes to the pretrial system, HB
463 made a number of post-conviction changes. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, PUBLIC SAFETY AND OFFENDER ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
(HB 463): JUSTICE REINVESTMENT SUMMARY 5–16 (2012), http://www.ncsl.org/
documents/nalfo/JusticeReinvestmentMikeMullins.pdf. Risk assessment tools
were made mandatory in the pre-sentencing report, for determining supervision
levels among defendants on probation or parole, and in determining parole suitability. Id. at 6. Other changes included mandatory re-entry supervision, a
speeding up of the parole process, and reduced penalties for drug possession and
minor drug trafficking. Id. at 7–8, 12–13.
255. Telephone Interview with Tara Boh Blair, Chief Operations Officer, Ky.
Pretrial Servs. (May 15, 2017).
256. For a summary of common pretrial risk assessment tools and their inputs, see Mayson, supra note 65, at 507–18.
257. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., JFA INST., KENTUCKY PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT VALIDATION 13 tbl.11 (2010), https://university.pretrial.org/
HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=60b06cf
8-f956-d6f1-d07f-a426f0465846.
258. Id. at 9 tbl.6.
259. Id. at 3.
260. Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD
FOUND., at 5 (Nov. 2013), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/02/LJAF-research-summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf.
261. Id. at 3.
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crime.262 The defendant’s overall risk score is a combination of
the risk of new arrest and the risk of FTA;263 a flag for being at
high risk of violent crime was added in 2014.264 The inputs for
the PSA are similar to those used in Kentucky’s previous risk
tool,265 although the weights are different and the non-criminaljustice items were eliminated.266
Kentucky was the first jurisdiction in which courts piloted
the PSA;267 it is now in use in approximately forty jurisdictions
throughout the United States, including the states of Arizona
and New Jersey.268 Throughout 2013 and 2014, the Arnold Foundation continued to do research on their tool and made several
modifications.269 In July of 2014 Kentucky switched to a modified version of the PSA: one that is currently in use in jurisdictions around the country.270 Age at arrest was added as an input
to the new criminal activity score, and the weighting was adjusted slightly.271
The risk assessment is conducted by the pretrial services officer right after the defendant is arrested and booked into jail.272
Using information gathered from the interview as well as the
defendant’s criminal records, the pretrial officer calculates the
defendant’s risk score and presents it to the judge during the bail
hearing.273 In Kentucky, the bail hearing is supposed to occur

262. Id. at 4. Lauryn Goulding provides compelling arguments for why it is
important to predict flight risk and danger separately. Lauryn P. Goulding, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L. REV. 837 (2016).
263. Based on internal documentation provided by the Kentucky Administrative Office of the Courts.
264. FIRST SIX MONTHS, supra note 175, at 3.
265. The inputs include: pending charge, prior misdemeanor conviction,
prior felony conviction, prior FTAs, prior violent conviction, prior incarceration,
violent current offense, violent current offense for someone under twenty-one.
Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment, supra note 260, at 4.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 3.
268. Pretrial Justice, LAURA & JOHN FOUND., http://www.arnoldfoundation
.org/initiative/criminal-justice/pretrial-justice (last visited Oct. 22, 2018).
269. Based on documentation provided by Kentucky Pretrial Services (on file
with author).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Virtual Tour of Kentucky Pretrial Services, KY. CT. JUST., http://courts
.ky.gov/courtprograms/pretrialservices/Pages/virtualtour.aspx (last visited Oct.
14, 2018) (providing detailed information about pretrial procedure in Kentucky).
273. Id.
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within 24 hours of booking.274 In many Kentucky counties, this
occurs via a phone call between the pretrial officer and the
judge.275 The pretrial officer informs the judge of the details of
the alleged offense as well as the risk level of the defendant.276
The judge decides a bail amount, supervision status, and any
other conditions of release.277 If the defendant does not post bail
within twenty-four hours, the pretrial officer notifies the court
at which point the judge can choose to change the bond.278 If the
judge does not alter the bond, or if the defendant still does not
post, the defendant usually must wait for the first appearance to
have the bond reconsidered.279
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
The data used in this study was provided by Kentucky’s Administrative Office of the Courts and covers all defendants who
were arrested and booked into jail between July 1, 2009 and July
1, 2016. The data was extracted in May 2017 from records maintained by Kentucky Pretrial Services and Kentucky courts. The
original data set contains more than 1.5 million criminal cases.
The analysis presented in this Article includes only cases that
originate with an arrest for a new criminal offense. Cases where
the original arrest was for a probation or parole violation, an
FTA, or a violation of conditions of pretrial release are omitted,
leaving 1,030,732 criminal cases.280
Table 1 presents a selection of statistics describing the sample used for analysis. The first column refers to misdemeanor
cases (65% of the sample) and the middle column refers to felony
cases. For reference, the rightmost column provides statistics

274. Telephone Interview with Tara Boh Blair, Chief Operations Officer, Ky.
Pretrial Services (May 15, 2017).
275. Virtual Tour of Kentucky Pretrial Services, supra note 272.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. The data used in this study, originally collected from the Kentucky Pretrial Services and Kentucky courts, is on file with the author. While bail decisions for violation and FTA cases are also interesting, there are good reasons
why they may be different than bail decisions for an original arrest; including
that both groups would complicate the interpretation of results. All of the main
results, however, are still found when analyzing the full sample of cases.
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from a national sample of felony defendants in large urban counties.281 While this is the most expansive data set publicly available to describe court processes nationally, it is not the most obvious comparison group since it is largely urban and Kentucky
is largely rural.282 Nonetheless, some differences and similarities
are worth noting. First, Kentucky defendants are more likely to
be white than those in large urban counties. Although the fraction of felony defendants facing violent charges is much lower in
Kentucky, the fraction who remain detained until their case is
disposed is similar to the national average in large urban counties. The fraction of felony defendants who are released within a
day is slightly lower in Kentucky and the fraction that is granted
non-financial release is considerably lower: less than half of the
non-financial release rate in urban counties. Misdemeanants
have a slightly higher release rate than felony defendants, but
still almost a quarter are detained until disposition and a third
spend more than one day in jail.
Bail amounts for defendants who are required to pay bond
are lower in Kentucky as well, possibly because there are no bail
bondsmen to loan money for bond. The fraction of released defendants with an FTA or pretrial rearrest are both lower in Kentucky than the national urban average.
Table 1 - Comparing Kentucky to a National Sample

Characteristic

Male
Age
Black
White
Hispanic
Has Violent
Felony Charge

Kentucky
misdemeanor
70%
34
16%
80%
3.6%
NA

Kentucky
felony
73%
33
19%
77%
1.7%
10%

National
sample
felony
83%
32
45%
30%
24%
25%

281. REAVES, supra note 31.
282. E.g., Urban Percentage of the Population for States, Historical, IOWA ST.
U.: IOWA COMMUNITY INDICATORS PROGRAM, https://www.icip.iastate.edu/
tables/population/urban-pct-states (last visited Oct. 14, 2018) (reporting that in
the results of the 2010 census, the urban percentage of the population in Kentucky was 58.4% while the same figure for the United States as a whole was
80.7%).
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Releasees Who
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33%

46%

43%

77%

62%

62%

66%

29%

31%

37%

16%

40%

$1000

$5000

$10000

$1000

$10000

$25000

14%

10%

17%

10%

13%

16%

10%

6%

NA

8%

8%

NA

As in other jurisdictions, a large fraction of Kentucky defendants who are required to pay cash bond to secure their release fail to post within three days of the bail hearing. Figure 1
shows the fraction of defendants with a given amount of bail who
are released within three days. Around 20% of defendants with
bail set at $500, and half of those with bail set at $2000, remain
in jail for more than three days beyond their booking date.283

283. The provision in HB 463 that granted $100 per day in bail credit was
routinely ignored. According to the author’s own calculations, about a third of
all judges never allowed this for any defendants. Only about 3% of defendants
with cash bail set in 2015 received bail credit. By Kentucky statute, judges are
allowed to refuse bail credit to defendants based on flight risk or danger. KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066(5)(b)(2) (West 2018).
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Figure 1 - Fraction Released at Various Levels of Cash
Bail

Note: Each bar indicates the fraction of defendants who are released within three days among those who had monetary bail set
at the amount shown.

C. HB 463 LED TO AN INCREASED USE OF RISK ASSESSMENT
(AND AN OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL METHODS)
This Section has two goals. First, it seeks to demonstrate
that Kentucky’s 2011 law mandating risk assessment resulted
in its increased use. Second, it explains the empirical methodology used throughout the remainder of Part III. These two goals
are combined because it can be useful to discuss methods with
the aid of an example, as opposed to discussing them abstractly.
The empirical methods used in this paper consist mostly of
graphical time-trend analysis: a visual representation of trends
and changes to pretrial outcomes. The focus of the analysis is on
sharp changes that occurred right around HB 463’s enactment
and Kentucky’s adoption of the PSA. A sharp, discrete change to
pretrial practices or outcomes whose timing coincides exactly
with the implementation of a new law or a new risk tool can
likely be attributed to that law or tool. The causes of longer term
trends are harder to identify, and thus are not a primary focus
of this article. While formal tests are not reported, all of the
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changes that this Article describes as occurring before/after HB
463 and before/after the PSA are statistically significant. With
more than a million criminal cases, any change that is visible in
a graphical time-trend analysis will also be highly statistically
significant.
Demonstrating that judges increased their use of the risk
assessment instrument when HB 463 made it mandatory requires showing that bail practices changed in accordance with
the action-directives associated with each risk classification. In
other words, it requires showing that judges became more lenient with defendants classified as low risk and stricter with defendants classified as high risk.
Figure 2 shows a time trend in the fraction of defendants in
each of the three risk groups who are granted non-financial release at the first bail hearing.284 The horizontal axis indicates
the booking date and the vertical axis is the fraction of defendants granted a non-financial release at the first bail hearing. The
dashed vertical line indicates the date that HB 463 was introduced as legislation and the solid vertical line indicates the date
it was implemented. The horizontal lines are estimates of the
time trend in non-financial release for defendants in each of the
three risk classification groups. The time trends are estimated
using local linear smoothing with a bandwidth of 120 days.285
The local linear smoothing is employed because on any given day
the actual number of defendants who are granted non-financial
release can be higher or lower than expected due to idiosyncratic
factors. This idiosyncratic fluctuation, often referred to as noise,

284. The unit of analysis in this, and in the remainder of this Article, is a
case. For conciseness, however, the time trends are described as referring to
defendants, not cases. Using more precise language, Figure 2 shows a time
trend in the fraction of cases in which defendants received non-financial release.
285. Details about this technique can be found in many places. See, e.g.,
STATA SOFTWARE, lpoly — Kernel-weighted Local Polynomial Smoothing, at 4–
8, http://www.stata.com/manuals13/rlpoly.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) (the
Stata manual for the command “lpoly”).
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is visually distracting, and so time trend graphs will almost always use some method of smoothing to make the trend easier to
see.
Figure 2 - How HB 463 Affected Non-financial Release
Rates for Defendants at Different Risk Levels

Note: The top, middle, and bottom line indicate the fraction of
low, moderate, and high-risk defendants who are granted nonfinancial release. The dashed vertical line is the date that HB
463 was introduced as legislation; the solid line indicates the
date it was implemented.

Each point on the dotted line represents the fraction of lowrisk defendants who are expected to get a non-financial release
on a particular date, and so forth for the other risk groups. The
shading around each line represents the 95% confidence interval—a measure of uncertainty—for the time trend. There are
cuts in the smoothing of the time trend at times when one might
expect sharp changes to the trend: in Figure 2 there is a cut at
the date when legislation was introduced and another at the date
it was implemented. The cuts function by limiting the data that
is used to build the trend line to only one side of the cut point. In
other words, the trend line for defendants who were booked right
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before a cut date will be estimated using only data from defendants booked before the cut date, and the same for defendants
booked right after a cut date.286
Figure 2 shows a dramatic increase in the fraction of lowrisk defendants who were granted non-financial release around
the time of HB 463. Before the bill was introduced only about
35% of low risk defendants were granted non-financial release,
but after its implementation that number rose to 57%: a 22 percentage point increase, or a 63% increase relative to the earlier
mean. The dashed line shows a 16 percentage point increase in
non-financial releases for moderate-risk defendants and the
solid line shows that the fraction of high-risk defendants receiving non-financial release remained essentially the same. This
figure shows that HB 463 resulted in a marked change in practices, which corresponded closely with the classifications of the
risk assessment.
Overall, HB 463 led to a sizeable decrease in bail for defendants who were ranked as low risk, a more moderate decrease in
bail for defendants ranked as moderate risk, and an increase in
bail for defendants ranked high risk, as shown in
Release rates changed accordingly. Figure 3 shows the
changes in the fraction of defendants who are released within
three days of the bail hearing before and after HB 463.287 HB 463
led to a 9 percentage point increase in releases for low-risk defendants, a 7 percentage point increase in releases for moderaterisk defendants, and a 4 percentage point decrease in releases
for high-risk defendants. Interestingly, there was no change in
the release rate for defendants who did not receive a risk score
due to difficulties in verifying key inputs. This further supports
the claim that the change in bail setting practices after HB 463
is due to the information provided by the risk assessment.

286. The Appendix provides an alternative method of graphing time
trends—binned scatter plots—which demonstrates each of the key empirical
claims made in this Article without the use of smoothing or cuts.
287. Defendants who were detained until the case was disposed, but for
whom disposition occurred within three days of the bail hearing, are counted as
released within three days.
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Figure 3 - The Impact that HB 463 Had on the Release Rate
of Defendants with Various Risk Classifications

Note: This figure shows the change in release rates between the two
months before HB 463 was introduced and the two months after it
was implemented. The change in release rates is shown for defendants who were rated low, moderate, or high risk, as well as for defendants who did not receive a risk score. A positive change means
that defendants were more likely to be released after HB 463 than
they were before.
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Table 2 - Impacts of HB 463 for Low-, Moderate-, and High-risk
Defendants

Outcome
Measure

Group

Before
HB 463

After
HB 463

35%
15%

57%
31%

5%
23%
29%

7%
14%
22%

+2
-9
-7

ModerateHigh Cash
Bail (greater
than $2500)

Low risk
Moderate
risk
High risk
Low risk
Moderate
risk
High risk
Low risk
Moderate
risk
High risk

Percentage
Point
Difference
+22
+16

NonFinancial
Bond

32%
24%
35%

25%
18%
31%

-7
-6
-4

45%

48%

+3

Release
Within 3
Days of
Booking

Low risk
Moderate
risk
High risk

73%
50%

81%
57%

+9
+7

34%

30%

-4

Low Cash
Bail ($1000
or less)

D. RISK ASSESSMENT’S IMPACT ON BOND SETTING AND RELEASE
While the previous section focused on differing impacts for
defendants with different risk classifications, this section shows
the overall effect on all defendants. Specifically, this section analyzes the impact that HB 463 and the adoption of the PSA had
on bond setting and release.
Figure 4 shows a time trend in the fraction of all defendants
granted non-financial release at the first bail hearing. From left
to right, the vertical lines indicate the date when HB 463 was
introduced and implemented, and the date that the PSA was
adopted and revised to the version that is now broadly used
around the country.
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Figure 4 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted the Likelihood of Non-financial Release

Note: This figure shows the fraction of defendants who are
granted non-financial release over time. From left to right, the
vertical lines indicate the date HB 463 was introduced as legislation, the date it was implemented as law, the date the PSA was
adopted, and the date it was modified.

Figure 4 shows a sharp jump up in the fraction of defendants
who are granted non-financial release coinciding exactly with
HB 463. The increase begins as soon as the bill was introduced
(it passed almost unanimously)288 and accelerates at the time of
implementation. In total, there is a 13 percentage point jump in
non-financial releases from January to June of 2011. Almost immediately, however, the rate of non-financial releases begins to
fall. It declined steadily until July 2013, when the PSA was
adopted. There is a smaller spike upwards after the adoption of
the PSA; then the non-financial release rate declines again after
that, with virtually no change as the PSA is revised. By January
of 2016, more than half of the increase in non-financial releases
resulting from HB 463 had disappeared.

288. See HEYERLY, supra note 216, at 4.
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Figure 5 shows the fraction of defendants given a low cash
bond (requiring a cash payment of $1000 or less) at the first bail
hearing. Interestingly, we see almost the exact inverse of the
pattern in Figure 4. HB 463 results in a sharp drop in the fraction of defendants receiving low cash bail, an increase over time
as practices move back toward their previous state, a small jump
down in low cash bail around the adoption of the PSA, and an
increase after that. This suggests that judges responded to the
risk assessment changes analyzed in this Article by substituting
non-financial release for low-cash bail. As time went on, however, they returned to their previous bail setting practices.
Figure 5 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted the Use of
Low Cash Bail

Note: This figure shows the fraction of defendants who are given
bail of $1000 or less. From left to right, the vertical lines indicate
the date HB 463 was introduced as legislation, the date it was
implemented as law, the date the PSA was adopted, and the date
it was modified.

Figure 6 shows a time trend in the fraction of defendants
who are released within three days of booking.289 For visual simplicity, and because there are very little changes that occur
289. About 5% of defendants have a holder, which decreases the release rate
somewhat.
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around that time, there is no cut in the time trend estimation at
the time the PSA is revised. As can be seen in Figure 6, neither
HB 463 nor the PSA has a big effect on the release rate. HB 463
led to only a 4 percentage point increase in the fraction of defendants released within three days of booking, and the adoption
of the PSA led to a barely perceptible 1 percentage point increase
in releases. It appears that most of the defendants granted a
non-financial release as a result of these changes would have
gotten out on a low cash bond regardless. Moreover, the small
increase in releases was short-lived: by 2015, the release rate
was lower than it had been before HB 463.
Figure 6 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted the Likelihood of Being Released Within Three Days of Booking

Note: This figure shows the fraction of defendants who are released within three days of booking. From left to right, the vertical lines indicate the date HB 463 was introduced as legislation,
the date it was implemented as law, the date the PSA was
adopted, and the date it was modified.

E. RISK ASSESSMENT’S IMPACTS ON PRETRIAL MISCONDUCT
The small increase in releases as a result of HB 463 was accompanied by an increase in the likelihood that defendants
would fail to appear in court. Figure 7 shows a sharp jump up in
the FTA rate (defined as the fraction of all defendants who fail
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to appear for at least one court date) from before the legislation
was introduced to after the new law was implemented. The size
of the increase—about 3 percentage point—was not large in and
of itself, but it is large relative to the base level: about a 40%
increase over the mean. The introduction of the PSA did not lead
to a decline in FTAs. If anything, the FTA rate is slightly higher
after the PSA was adopted than before. This does not necessarily
reflect on the PSA, however, as there is no sharp change in FTAs
that coincides with the date that the PSA was adopted. The drift
upward in FTAs during that time period could have been caused
by some other factor.
Figure 7 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted the Likelihood a Defendant Would have at Least One FTA

Note: This figure shows the fraction of defendants who fail to appear in court at least once. From left to right, the vertical lines
indicate the date HB 463 was introduced as legislation, the date
it was implemented as law, the date the PSA was adopted, and
the date it was modified.

Figure 8 shows a time trend in the fraction of all defendants
who were arrested for a new offense during the pretrial period.290
The graph shows an increase in rearrests around the time of HB
463. The increase is less of a stark and indisputable break in
290. The pretrial rearrest rate captures only arrests that are for new crimes,
not arrests for violation of court orders or FTAs.
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trend than was seen for FTAs in Figure 7. Inferring that HB 463
led to an increase in rearrests requires inferring that the drop in
rearrests right before the introduction of the legislation was indicative of a meaningful change in trend that would have continued in the absence of the law. One could also argue that the drop
down in rearrests toward the end of 2010 was just an idiosyncratic fluctuation in the rearrest rate, and the rise after the legislation was introduced was simply more idiosyncratic fluctuation. Alternative analysis, shown in the Appendix, suggests that
the former interpretation is more likely.291 Regardless, it is clear
that the increased use of risk assessments as a result of HB 463
did not result in a decline in the pretrial rearrest rate.
There is no sharp change in the pretrial rearrest rate around
either the adoption or modification of the PSA. The pretrial rearrest rate is slightly higher after the adoption of the PSA, but
this appears to be part of a general upward drift in the pretrial
rearrest rate and thus not likely to be due to the change in risk
assessment tools.292

291. A post-HB 463 pretrial rearrest increase can also be seen using an alternative measure of rearrest, and in a sub-sample of non-drug felony defendants.
292. The Arnold Foundation report that claimed that the PSA led to lower
rates of pretrial rearrest, FIRST SIX MONTHS, supra note 175, used a slightly
different sample (all cases, not just cases that began with an arrest for a new
offense) and a different measure (the fraction of released defendants with a pretrial arrest, not the fraction of all defendants with a pretrial rearrest). This is
not the cause of the disparity between their results and those shown in this
Article. Using their methods, this author was able to replicate their findings
and show that the post-PSA pretrial rearrest rate rose from 8.5% at the time
that their report was published to 11% once all cases had resolved. See supra
note 218 and accompanying text (providing more discussion about the differences in results).
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Figure 8 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted the Likelihood a Defendant Would be Arrested Pretrial for a New
Offense

Note: This figure shows the fraction of defendants who are
arrested for a new offense during the pretrial period. From
left to right, the vertical lines indicate the date HB 463 was
introduced as legislation, the date it was implemented as
law, the date the PSA was adopted, and the date it was modified.

Figure 9 shows another important pretrial outcome: the
fraction of defendants who are rearrested for a violent felony pretrial. There are no visually discernible changes in the violent felony rearrest rate occurring as a result of either HB 463 or the
adoption of the PSA. Furthermore, this rate is very low. Less
than one percent of all defendants are rearrested for a violent
felony (murder, non-negligible manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, or aggravated assault) during the pretrial period.
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Figure 9 – How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted the Likelihood
a Defendant Would be Rearrested Pretrial for a Violent Felony Offense

Note: This figure shows the fraction of defendants who are arrested
for a violent felony during the pretrial period. From left to right, the
vertical lines in each chart indicate the date HB 463 was introduced
as legislation, the date it was implemented as law, the date the PSA
was adopted, and the date it was modified.

The changes that were shown graphically in this Section are
summarized in Table 3. The left-most numerical column shows
outcomes for all defendants booked during the two months before HB 463 legislation was introduced: December 2010 and January 2011. The next column shows outcomes for all defendants
booked in the two months after HB 463 was implemented: July
and August of 2011. The final two columns show the two-month
averages before and after the adoption of the PSA: May and June
of 2013 and July and August of 2013.
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Table 3 - Impacts of HB 463 and PSA for All Defendants

Outcome
NonFinancial
Release
Within 3
Days
Low Cash
Bail ($1000
or Less)
Release
Within 3
Days
FTA
Pretrial
Rearrest
Violent
Rearrest
Pretrial

Before
HB 463
21%

After
HB 463
34%

Before
PSA 1
31%

After
PSA 1
35%

32%

25%

26%

23%

63%

67%

64%

65%

7.6%
7.3%

9.6%
8%

9%
8%

9.4%
8%

0.52%

0.59%

0.56%

0.52%

The Appendix provides several figures to demonstrate that
the results presented in Parts II.D and II.E are robust to alternative specifications. In particular, the Appendix shows that the
key results are not caused by changes in the types of defendants
who are arrested, are robust to alternative methods of measuring pretrial rearrest and FTA, do not depend on specific choices
regarding smoothing and cut points, and are prevalent among a
group of defendants who are least likely to be affected by other
non-risk-assessment related aspects of HB 463.
F. RACIAL AND REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN BOND AND RELEASE
This Section evaluates whether risk assessment affected racial disparities in the likelihood that a defendant is granted nonfinancial release or is otherwise released within three days of
booking. Figure 10 shows time trends in the fraction of white
defendants who are granted non-financial release (the dashed
line) and the fraction of black defendants who are granted nonfinancial release (the solid line). Relative to black defendants,
white defendants are more likely to be granted non-financial release throughout the entire time period of the sample (This could
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be due to racial bias, but it could also be due to differences in the
charged offense, criminal history, etc.). There was an increase in
non-financial release for both groups as a result of HB 463, however the increase was larger for white defendants than it was for
blacks. The racial gap jumped from about 2 percentage point to
10 percentage point after HB 463 was implemented and remained relatively constant through January of 2016.
Figure 10 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted Racial
Disparities in Non-financial Release

Note: The dashed horizontal line shows the fraction of white
defendants who are granted non-financial release and the solid
line shows the fraction of black defendants who are granted
non-financial release. From left to right, the vertical lines indicate the date HB 463 was introduced as legislation, the date it
was implemented as law, the date the PSA was adopted, and
the date it was modified.

Figure 11 shows time trends for both races in the likelihood
of being released within three days of booking. We see a similar
but more attenuated pattern; the race gap increased after HB
463 and then remained relatively constant at about 5 percentage
points. In fact, despite the increase in the likelihood of being
granted non-financial release, HB 463 did not lead to a visually
discernible increase in the likelihood of being released within 3
days for black defendants.
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Figure 11 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted Racial Disparities in Pretrial Release

Note: The dashed horizontal line shows the fraction of white defendants who are released within three days and the solid line shows the
fraction of black defendants who are released within three days. From
left to right, the vertical lines indicate the date HB 463 was introduced as legislation, the date it was implemented as law, the date the
PSA was adopted, and the date it was modified.

Figure 12 shows that there are regional disparities in the
likelihood of being detained pretrial. The dashed line shows a
time trend in the fraction of rural defendants who are released
within three days of booking and the solid line shows the same
for non-rural defendants. Before HB 463, rural defendants were
about 8 percentage point more likely to be detained pretrial than
those living in cities or suburban areas.293 However, this gap
shrunk and then reversed itself over time. The gap shrunk partly
because rural regions responded more to HB 463 than non-rural
regions. It also shrunk because the release rate dropped precipitously for non-rural regions over the six years of analysis: from
a high of about 70% in January 2010 to a low of 55% in January
2016.
293. There are a variety of potential explanations for this gap: differences in
access to bail money, judicial attitudes, the charged offense, criminal history,
difficulties with monitoring pretrial releases, etc.
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Figure 12 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted Rural/Urban Disparities in Pretrial Release

Note: The dashed horizontal line shows the fraction of rural defendants who are released within three days and the solid line
shows the fraction of non-rural defendants who are released within
three days. From left to right, the vertical lines indicate the date
HB 463 was introduced as legislation, the date it was implemented
as law, the date the PSA was adopted, and the date it was modified.

The differing trends in rural and non-rural regions complicate the analysis of racial disparities, since rural regions have a
high percentage of white defendants (85%) while non-rural regions are more mixed (around 68% white and 30% black). Thus,
the fact that white defendants appear to have been advantaged
by HB 463 more than black defendants could simply be because
they live in regions where the judges changed their bond setting
habits more as a result of the law.
The upper graph of Figure 13 shows racial disparities over
time once county effects and regional time trends have been accounted for. This was accomplished by estimating the average
release rate for all races in each county by month by year.294 Fig-

294. Formally, this is constructed by regressing a dummy for being released
pretrial on county fixed effects as well as circuit-by-month-by-year fixed effects
and then collecting the residuals from that regression. The left graph in Figure
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ure 13 plots the difference between the actual and predicted release rate for white and black defendants. The fact that the horizontal time trend for white defendants hovers at around 1 percentage point indicates that white defendants are about 1
percentage point more likely to be released than the county average. Similarly, black defendants are 3–4 percentage point less
likely to be released than the county average. As can be seen,
once county effects and varying time trends at the circuit level
have been accounted for, the racial gap in the likelihood of being
released is pretty constant over time at about 5 percentage point
While this research design is not well suited for detecting small
changes, there is no visible evidence to suggest that risk assessment affected racial disparities once differing regional trends
were accounted for.

13 is a local linear time trend of those residuals for black and white defendants.
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Disparities in Pretrial Release After Accounting for
County Effects (upper) and County + Charge + Recent
Criminal History Effects (lower)

Note: In each figure, the dashed line shows a time trend in
releases for white defendants and the solid line shows a time
trend in releases for black defendants. The upper figure shows
the difference in release rates once county effects and time
trends have been accounted for. The lower figure shows the
difference in release rates once county effects, time trends, offense, age, gender, and recent criminal history have been accounted for. From left to right, the vertical lines in each chart
indicate the date HB 463 was introduced as legislation, the
date it was implemented as law, the date the PSA was
adopted, and the date it was modified.
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The lower graph in Figure 13 shows that about half of the
racial gap in release rates disappears once gender, age, detailed
information about the charge, and recent criminal history is accounted for.295 This graph shows the difference between the actual release rates and the predicted release rates, using predictions which take into account not only county by month by year
effects, but also age, gender, the top charge, the total number of
charges, the level of the charges, and whether or not the defendant has a pending case, prior case, or FTA within the year before
the booking date.296 Even after accounting for these variables,
black defendants are still about 2–3 percentage point more likely
to be detained than white defendants. There are a number of potential explanations for this gap. For one, the data does not include the full criminal history. It’s possible that black defendants
have more prior arrests/FTAs and thus had higher bail. Racial
bias could also lead the judge to set higher bail, although this is
less likely in Kentucky since judges are often unaware of the race
of the defendant when setting bail. Third, due to correlations between race and income, black defendants may be less able to afford a given amount of bail than white defendants.
In sum, Part III provided evidence that judges did use the
risk assessment more when it was made mandatory in HB 463.
HB 463 resulted in a 22 percentage point increase in the likelihood of non-financial release for low risk defendants and a 16
percentage point increase in the likelihood of non-financial release for moderate risk defendants. However, some of those who
were released on non-financial bond as a result of HB 463 would
have otherwise been released on low cash bond. Thus, the net
effects on the release rate were attenuated. HB 463 led to a 9
percentage point increase in total releases (both non-financial
and on money bond) for low-risk defendants, a 7 percentage point
increase in releases for moderate-risk defendants, and a 4 percentage point decrease in releases for high-risk defendants. In
total, this resulted in a 4 percentage point increase in the release
295. The graph on the right of Figure 13 shows residuals from a regression
of a release dummy on county fixed effects, circuit-by-month-by-year fixed effects, the exact charge for the forty-two most common top charges, the total
number of charges, whether the defendant had at least one class A, B, C or D
felony, whether the defendant had at least one class A or B misdemeanor, the
age at arrest, gender, and whether the defendant had a prior arrest, a prior
FTA, or a pending charge within the year before booking.
296. The criminal history is limited to a year before the booking date since
the data begins in July of 2009. Thus, estimating more than a year of criminal
history data would not be possible for defendants who are booked toward the
beginning of the data set.
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rate for all defendants, which eroded over time as judges returned to their previous bail setting habits. FTAs increased by 3
percentage point after HB 463 was implemented, and pretrial
rearrest increased by about 1 percentage point The adoption of
the PSA had negligible effects on the overall release rate, FTA
rate, or pretrial rearrest rate. Neither HB 463 nor the PSA had
any effect on racial disparities once regional differences were accounted for.
IV. LEARNING FROM KENTUCKY’S EXPERIENCE WITH
RISK ASSESSMENT
This Section discusses various implications of the empirical
results presented in Part III. It begins by exploring potential reasons why the large gains that many had assumed would accompany the adoption of the risk assessment tool were not realized
in Kentucky. It discusses ways that Kentucky’s experience with
pretrial risk assessment should and should not affect expectations about the impacts of risk assessment in other jurisdictions.
Finally, it calls for a new direction in the evidence-based criminal justice movement: a deeper integration of evaluation into the
process of adopting new methods.
A. WHY NO EFFICIENCY GAINS?
After HB 463, judges incorporated risk assessment into
their bail practices significantly more than they had previously.
If the risk classifications of the risk assessment instrument were
much more accurate than the judge’s intuitive assessment of
risk, one might expect a gain in efficiency. This could be seen as
a simultaneous decrease in detention rates, FTAs, and pretrial
crime—or at least decreasing one without increasing the others.
This did not occur. Why not?
First, risk assessment tools may not have provided as large
a gain in predictive power as expected. As discussed in Part II.A
of this Article, the research arguing that actuarial tools out perform human intuition in predicting crime is far from definitive.
While there are reasons to believe that risk assessment tools provide new and useful information, the margin of gain is unclear.
Another possibility is that judicial discretion was used not
to correct the risk assessment when it erred, but to override the
risk assessment when it was correct. Human decision-making
has been shown to be subject to a variety of foibles: false heuristics, over-weighting of small probabilities, over-confidence, risk
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aversion, etc.297 While these types of human error are part of the
reason to expect that actuarial prediction tools can out-predict
human intuition, they may also be reasons why actuarial prediction tools are not that useful in practice. The policy-relevant
question is not “Is the actuarial tool better at predicting misconduct than the judge” but rather “Does the judge make better decisions when given access to actuarial predictions?” A recent survey indicates that only a small minority of judges think that a
risk assessment tool does a better job at predicting future crime
than themselves.298 Given this skepticism, it is unclear under
what circumstances judges make different decisions as a result
of the tool than they would have otherwise. If the prediction tool
fails to influence decisions in circumstances where the predictive
gains are the greatest, the usefulness of the tool will be curtailed.
It is also possible that the use of actuarial risk tools did lead
to a substantial increase in the predictive capacity of judges, but
that this information did not translate into improved outcomes.
One of the most dramatic changes in bail setting practice as a
result of HB 463 is an increase in non-financial release as opposed to release on low-cash bond. While this likely resulted in a
decrease in the number of defendants detained pretrial due to an
inability to pay bail, it may have reduced the incentives for released defendants to show up in court. Alternative methods of
increasing appearance rates, such as court notifications, were
rare: less than 5% of released defendants were assigned by the
court to receive phone call reminders of their next appearance
(Kentucky has since dramatically expanded their use of court reminders).299 If the action-directives associated with being classified as low risk included robust support to help defendants overcome barriers to appearance (difficulties with transportation,
getting time off work, arranging child care, etc.), the use of the
tool may have been more effective.
Generally speaking, risk assessments will only lead to lower
rates of misconduct if the action-directives associated with them
297. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Bias, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974) (generally discussing a number
of different cognitive heuristics and biases that affect the ability to assess probabilities).
298. See Chanenson & Hyatt, supra note 120, at 10.
299. Jennifer Elek et al., Use of Court Date Reminder Notices to Improve
Court Appearance Rates, PRETRIAL JUST. CTR. FOR CTS., at 1 (Sept. 2017),
https://www.ncsc.org/Microsites/PJCC/Home/Topics/Pretrial-Services.aspx;
(follow “Use of Court Date Reminder Notices to Improve Court Appearance
Rates” hyperlink).
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are effective at mitigating risk. Identifying the appropriate interventions for different risk levels is non-trivial. For instance,
will placing high-risk defendants in pretrial detention decrease
crime, or will the destabilizing effects of incarceration actually
lead to more crime?300 Or, to take the example discussed in Part
II.C, does assignment to a higher security prison decrease the
likelihood of within-prison misconduct? Richard Berk and coauthors showed that using actuarial risk assessment to assign prisoners to different security classifications did not lead to lower
rates of offending while in prison.301 It did, however, appear to
be effective at sorting prisoners based on offending level: while
the total offending rates were the same, the rates were higher in
high security prisons and lower in low security prisons.302 If the
use of risk assessment did not lead to lower total offenses, it may
simply have been because placement in high security prisons
was not effective at preventing offending.
B. LESSONS FOR OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Jurisdictions around the country differ widely in their criminal procedure, culture, and demographics. The experience other
jurisdictions have with risk assessment will not, in general, be
an exact mirror of Kentucky’s. Nonetheless, certain lessons can
be drawn from Kentucky’s experience that should influence what
to expect from pretrial risk assessment in other areas.
First, Kentucky’s experience with risk assessment should
temper hopes that the adoption of risk assessment will lead to a
dramatic decrease in incarceration with no concomitant costs in
terms of crime or failures to appear. That is not to say that risk
assessment brought no benefit. Just because Kentucky was not
able to simultaneously improve along all three margins (detention, crime, and FTAs) doesn’t mean that the tool wasn’t useful.
It simply means that realizing large gains in practice are not as
easy as realizing them in a hypothetical policy simulation. While
it is certainly possible that other jurisdictions will experience a
larger efficiency gain than Kentucky, there is no strong a priori
reason to expect this to be the case. The risk tools used in Kentucky are similar or identical to other pretrial risk assessment

300. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream
Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 715
(2017).
301. See Berk et al., supra note 208, at 232.
302. Id. at 235.
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tools currently in use.303 They were shown to be predictive of future offending and non-appearance.304 The action-directives associated with the tool—non-financial release for low-risk defendants, release onto supervision for moderate-risk defendants, and
supervision or detention for high-risk defendants—are fairly
typical of the action-directives used in other jurisdictions.305
Kentucky’s practice of allowing judges the discretion to deviate
from these action-directives if they find a crime or flight risk is
also typical of pretrial policy.306
Kentucky does differ, however, in that it was an early
adopter of risk instruments. This meant that the margins of
change analyzed in HB 463 were not the difference between having and not having a risk instrument, but the difference between
having a risk instrument that was not heavily used and being
required to consider it as part of the release decision. Furthermore, the fact that Kentucky was an early adopter means that
the change being analyzed happened before risk assessment
tools had gained the popularity that they currently have. This
cultural shift may affect judges’ openness to these tools. For both
of these reasons, the margin of change before and after HB 463
is lower than it might be in other jurisdictions.
While the Kentucky experience should temper hopes that
pretrial risk assessment will result in a dramatic decline in detention rates with no increase in FTAs or pretrial crime, it does
not mean those hopes should be abandoned. As discussed in the
previous Section, the usefulness of risk assessment in practice
depends on a number of factors that are, as of yet, poorly understood. Future studies may show that risk assessment has been
more successful in other contexts and may provide insight on
how to replicate and expand that success.
As for racial disparities, it is unclear whether the Kentucky
experience with risk assessment will be replicated in other jurisdictions. Kentucky is a largely rural,307 predominantly white
state.308 Racial dynamics in Kentucky are not expected to be rep-

303.
304.
3–4.
305.
306.
4.
307.
308.

See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 257; FIRST SIX MONTHS, supra note 175, at
See Koepke & Robinson, supra note 86, at 22–23.
Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula, supra note 37, at
Urban Percentage of the Population for States, supra note 282.
E.g., QuickFacts: Kentucky, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census
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resentative of racial dynamics in dense urban areas, in the heavily Latino southwest, or in the black rural south. That does not,
however, mean that Kentucky’s experience provides no useful
knowledge. In some regards, Kentucky provides a particularly
stringent test of racial bias in risk assessment. Bail hearings in
Kentucky usually happen over the phone between the judge and
the pretrial officer.309 Thus, the judge is less likely to be aware
of the race of the defendant, which should minimize the incidence of explicit racial bias. Demonstrating that risk assessment
does not increase racial disparities relative to the status quo
when the status quo is not likely to be heavily biased is a
stronger finding than showing that it does not increase racial
disparities relative to potentially racist judges. Thus, Kentucky’s
experience with risk assessment should somewhat assuage concerns about expanded racial disparities, but further research is
needed.
Jurisdictions adopt risk assessment for a variety of reasons.
In addition to hopes of increased efficiency, jurisdictions may
look to risk assessment as a way to centralize and standardize
pretrial decision-making. This is likely to be particularly appealing to bail reform advocates who seek to lower pretrial detention
rates. In fact, lowering the jail population was one of the goals of
HB 463.310 Kentucky demonstrates some of the challenges with
this technocratic approach to bail reform. While judges certainly
changed behaviors as a result of HB 463, they deviated from the
action-directives associated with the risk assessment more often
than not. Kentucky statute contains a presumptive default of
non-monetary release for 90% of defendants, yet judges only
granted non-financial release in less than a third of these
cases—a clear violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the
law.311 If the hope is to use risk assessment to coax pretrial practices in a certain direction, careful thought should be given to
how to achieve this goal. Likely this involves either establishing
clear guidelines for when deviation is or is not allowed, making
deviation costly for the judge in some way (e.g. requiring a detailed written explanation of the reasons for deviation), or nur-

.gov/quickfacts/ky (last visited Oct. 14, 2018) (reporting that 87.8% of Kentucky’s population is white).
309. Virtual Tour of Kentucky Pretrial Services, supra note 272.
310. See Jensen & Tilley, supra note 24 and accompanying text.
311. See supra Table 3.
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turing a culture change among judges. These strategies may differ in jurisdictions where judges are elected, like Kentucky,312
and in jurisdictions where judges are appointed, like New Jersey.313
The limits of enacting criminal justice reform via statute
alone are not limited to risk assessment. In Kentucky, the tenuous connection between statute and practice permeates the pretrial process. For example, Kentucky has a statute stating that
defendants can earn a $100 credit toward the payment of bail for
each day detained pretrial.314 Yet a vaguely worded loophole (except if “found by the court to present a flight risk or to be a danger to others”) can result in blanket override of the statute if a
judge so chooses.315 In fact, one third of the judges never allow
jail time credit for any defendant.316 Even clearly written law
from the Kentucky Constitution is routinely ignored. The constitution states that defendants have a right to bail except in capital cases.317 Yet of the 24,000 defendants who were denied bond
during the time period of the analysis, 90% of them were charged
with only a misdemeanor or level D felony. Anecdotally, these
were mostly defendants who demonstrated a persistent pattern
of failing to appear in court,318 but a reasonable explanation does
not negate the violation of constitutional rights.
C. TOWARD A NEW DIRECTION IN EVIDENCE-BASED CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
Data, science, and technology have been rapidly changing
all aspects of modern life, from how we work, to how we learn, to
312. Judicial elections occurred in Kentucky in November 2010, KY. STATE
BD. ELECTIONS, OFFICIAL 2010 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS (Nov. 2, 2010),
https://elect.ky.gov/SiteCollectionDocuments/Election%20Results/2010-2019/
2010/off2010gen.pdf, and November 2014, KY. STATE BD. ELECTIONS, OFFICIAL
2014 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS (Nov. 4, 2014), https://elect.ky.gov/results/
2010-2019/Pages/2014PrimaryandGeneralElectionResults.aspx (follow “Official Election Results” hyperlink).
313. Judicial Selection in the States: New Jersey, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=NJ (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
314. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066(5)(a) (West 2018).
315. Id. § 431.066(5)(b)(2).
316. Based on author’s own calculations.
317. KY. CONST. § 16 (“All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient securities,
unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption
great. . . .”).
318. Telephone Interview with Tara Boh Blair, Chief Operations Officer, Ky.
Pretrial Services (May 15, 2017).
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how we spend time with our friends and family. Tech-industry
enthusiasts describe this process as “creative disruption”: a dramatic change in how people accomplish certain tasks with the
advent of a new, more effective method.319 Many people would
agree that the criminal justice system is itself in need of some
creative disruption. Billions of dollars are spent each year on policing, prosecuting, incarcerating, and monitoring our communities, yet few are satisfied with the results. Crime rates remain
high in many neighborhoods, racial disparities abound, and the
system is commonly viewed as opaque, ad-hoc, unfair, outdated,
and ineffective.
The ideas and practices associated with evidence-based
criminal justice have likely advanced in no small part from a
hope that data, science, and technology will bring improvements
to a system in need of reform. However, enthusiasm for the potential of new technologies may have led us to put the cart before
the horse: widescale adoption of risk assessment before knowing
anything about whether it will bring meaningful improvement.
Risk assessment tools wear the clothes of an evidence-based
practice—they are developed with the use of large data sets and
sophistical techniques and endorsed by social scientists running
policy simulations—but risk assessments should not be considered evidence-based until they have shown to be effective.
This Article advocates a new direction in evidence-based
criminal justice: one in which an iterative process of evaluation
and adaptation is central. This involves a shift away from blindly
adopting practices that bear the evidence-based moniker, and toward integrating evaluation into the everyday operations of
criminal justice. When a new technique is adopted, outcomes
should be monitored to see if the desired effects were achieved.
If they were not, adjustments can be made accordingly. In this
paradigm, a method would be neither championed nor pilloried
until its impacts in practice are clearly understood. This paradigm is characterized by informed curiosity: a willingness to try
new techniques, but also a willingness to learn and adjust if the
new techniques did not work as hoped.
In many ways, Kentucky Pretrial Services embodies that
ideal. Over the years they have shown a continued willingness
not only to try new methods, but also to evaluate how those
319. See, e.g., CREATIVE DISRUPTION: THE IMPACT OF EMERGING TECHNOLCREATIVE ECONOMY, WORLD ECON. FORUM (2018), http://www3
.weforum.org/docs/39655_CREATIVE-DISRUPTION.pdf (discussing the impact of emerging technologies on the creative economy).
OGIES ON THE
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methods have affected key outcomes, and change practices if
need be. This capacity did not materialize out of thin air. For
one, it requires a data infrastructure that took many years of
hard work to develop and implement. Once developed, however,
their data systems allowed them to monitor changes and trends
in bail, release, and pretrial misconduct. For example, they have
been aware that the release rate has been dropping precipitously, particularly in urban areas. In cooperation with Kentucky Pretrial Services, Kentucky’s highest court has recently
declared a major revision in the way pretrial risk assessment is
used in their state. As of 2017, all defendants who are rated low
and moderate risk and who are charged with low level crimes
(non-violent and non-sexual misdemeanors as well as certain
Class D felonies) are granted immediate non-financial release.320
No bail hearing is required, thus no judicial discretion is involved in the decision. If the goal is to liberalize release for low
level defendants, Kentucky’s new method of using risk assessments may prove more effective than how they were used previously. Hopefully future studies will chart the impacts of this
change and help advance our knowledge about the different
ways risk assessments can be used in practice.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with a quote stating that we are beyond
the point that risk assessment can be thought of as a trend, and
into a “risk assessment era.”321 That one of the foremost examples of evidence-based criminal justice has advanced as far as it
has with so little evidence on its impacts is a little unnerving.
While evidence-based criminal justice is commonly cited as an
ideal, we are still far from embodying it in practice.
This Article evaluated the impacts of pretrial risk assessment in a state that has been widely heralded as a leader in pretrial reform. It showed that pretrial risk assessment in Kentucky
led to neither the dramatic efficiency gains predicted by risk assessment’s champions, nor the increase in racial disparities predicted by its critics. While discussion and research about the expected outcomes of a change in policy will always be important,
real world implementation can differ from what theory predicts
in a number of ways.
320. Authorization for the Non-Financial Uniform Schedule of Bail Administrative Release Program, No. 2016-10, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. Administrative Release App. A (West through May 1, 2018).
321. Starr, supra note 6.
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Empirical research evaluating risk assessment will expand,
and we will learn more about the impacts of risk assessment in
different contexts. Kentucky’s experience should temper expectations but not eliminate hopes; risk assessment tools may prove
to be a highly beneficial input to criminal justice, but understanding how and under what conditions is likely to take time
and careful research.
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APPENDIX
Figure 14 confirms that the time trends shown in the main
body of the text are not meaningfully influenced by changes in
the type of defendants being arrested. The four graphs in Figure
14 show, clockwise from top left, a variant of the time trend in
non-financial release, release within three days, pretrial rearrest, and FTAs. Instead of showing the actual fraction of defendants for whom each outcome was present, the figures show residuals from a regression of the outcome on detailed variables
describing the offense, basic demographics, and recent criminal
history. These residuals are the difference between the actual
outcome and the predicted outcome (where the predictions are
based on the descriptors listed above). This process helps remove
the effect of any change in defendants over time. For example,
the fact that the release rate is declining over time might have
been explained by a pattern in which the defendants arrested
toward the end of the sample have committed more serious
crimes than those who were arrested toward the beginning of the
sample. If the charges that defendants are facing grow more serious, it would not be surprising that the release rate fell.
The trends shown in Figure 14 look quite similar to the time
trends shown in Part II.D and Part II.E of this paper. The trends
are centered at zero, since the vertical axis is measuring the difference between the predicted rates and the actual rates. However, the patterns are qualitatively quite similar, as are the magnitudes of change. Thus, the evidence presented in Part II.D and
II.E is likely explained by differences in pretrial practices as opposed to a change in the type of people who are arrested.
Figure 15 also shows time trends in non-financial release,
release within three days, FTA and pretrial rearrest. However,
these trends are not built using linear smoothing like the figures
in the main body of the text do. Figure 15 consists of scatter
plots, where each dot represents the average outcome for all defendants booked within a two-month span. As such, the figures
are visually somewhat noisier. Nonetheless, the patterns remain
the same: visually discernible increases in non-financial release,
net release, FTA, and pretrial rearrest right after HB 463 is implemented, and little discernible change around the adoption of
the PSA. This eases concerns that any specific choices about the
method of linear smoothing or the cuts in the time trend that
were used in the graphs shown in the main body of the text created misleading visual impressions.
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Figure 16 shows time trends in the same four outcome
measures that were shown in the previous figures, but the sample is limited to felony defendants who are not facing any drug
charges. Since the other pretrial-related changes that were enacted as part of HB 463 are expected to mostly affect drug offenders and misdemeanants, this specification helps ensure that
the patterns we are seeing are truly a result of risk assessment.
Once again, the results are qualitatively very similar: the same
sharp changes are seen around the time of HB 463 and very little
change around the adoption of the PSA.
The top two graphs in Figure 17 provide alternative methods of evaluating time trends in FTAs and pretrial rearrest. The
measures used in this figure were constructed from the data: a
defendant was considered to have an FTA if the data shows that
the same person was arrested for non-appearance after the original booking date and before the original case was disposed.
Likewise, for pretrial rearrest: a defendant is considered to have
a pretrial rearrest if they are arrested on a new charge after the
original booking date and before the original case was disposed.
These measures are different from those used in the main body
of the text. The pretrial misconduct measures used in Part III
were inputted by pretrial services officers. Pretrial officers see
all FTAs while the data shows only FTAs that resulted in an arrest. These alternative measures provide a robustness check – a
different method that shows similar results. Just like the figures
shown in the main body of the text, Figure 17 shows an increase
in FTAs and pretrial rearrest that occurs immediately after HB
463, and no change after the adoption of the PSA.
Finally, the bottom two graphs in Figure 17 show the fraction of released defendants who had an FTA or pretrial rearrest.322 (Figure 7 and Figure 8 in the main text show the fraction
of all defendants with an FTA or pretrial rearrest.) This allows
us to evaluate the extent to which the increase in misconduct
occurred solely because there were more people released. The
bottom left graph in in Figure 17 shows that even looking solely
at released defendants, the fraction with an FTA increases after
HB 463. Thus, the changed conditions of release (non-financial
release vs. release on low cash bond) or a change in the type of
people who were released is likely responsible for the increase in
FTAs once risk assessment became mandatory. However, the
322. The measures used here are the ones that were inputted by the pretrial
officers, however the graphs look very similar to the ones constructed by the
data.
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bottom right graph in Figure 17 shows that the fraction of released defendants who have a pretrial rearrest, however, does
not exhibit much of an increase after HB 463. Thus, the increase
shown in Figure 8 is likely a result of an increase in the number
of people released.
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Figure 14 - Adjusting for Offense, Demographics, and Criminal History

Note: Clockwise from top left, the figures show time trends in the
fraction of defendants granted non-financial release, the fraction of
defendants released within three days, the fraction who are arrested
for a new offense during the pretrial period, and the fraction of defendants who fail to appear to at least one court date. From left to
right, the vertical lines in each chart indicate the date HB 463 was
introduced as legislation, the date it was implemented as law, the
date the PSA was adopted, and the date it was modified. The horizontal axis is the booking date and the vertical axes are residuals
from regressions where the predictor variables consist of the exact
charge (for the 42 most common top charges), the total number of
charges, whether the defendant had at least one class A, B, C or D
felony, whether the defendant had at least one class A or B misdemeanor, the age at arrest, gender, and whether the defendant had a
prior arrest, a prior FTA, or a pending charge within the year before
booking. The time trends begin in July of 2010 so that all defendants
have at least one year of criminal history data.
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Figure 15 - Two Month Averages

Note: Clockwise from top left, the figures show two month averages in the fraction of defendants granted non-financial release,
the fraction of defendants released within three days, the fraction
who are arrested for a new offense during the pretrial period, and
the fraction of defendants who fail to appear to at least one court
date. From left to right, the vertical lines in each chart indicate
the date HB 463 was introduced as legislation, the date it was implemented as law, the date the PSA was adopted, and the date it
was modified.
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Figure 16 - Non-Drug Felonies

Note: Clockwise from top left, the figures show time trends in the
fraction of defendants charged with a non-drug-related felony who
were granted non-financial release, released within three days, arrested for a new offense during the pretrial period, and who failed
to appear for at least one court date. From left to right, the vertical
lines in each chart indicate the date HB 463 was introduced as
legislation, the date it was implemented as law, the date the PSA
was adopted, and the date it was modified.
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Figure 17 - Alternative Specifications
Top: Alternative measures of FTA and pretrial rearrest

Bottom: FTA rate and pretrial rearrest rate defined as fraction of
released defendants, not fraction of all defendants, with misconduct

Note: The top left shows a time trend failures-to-appear and the
top right shows a time trend in pretrial rearrest. While the FTA
and pretrial rearrest measures used in the main body of the text
were as reported by the pretrial officers, these measures were constructed from the data. A defendant was considered to have an
FTA (pretrial rearrest) if the data shows that they were rearrested
for an FTA between the time of the original arrest and the time of
disposition. The bottom two figures show the same FTA and pretrial measure used in the main body of the text, but the time trend
is the fraction of released defendants with one of these outcomes,
not the fraction of all defendants. From left to right, the vertical
lines in each chart indicate the date HB 463 was introduced as
legislation, the date it was implemented as law, the date the PSA
was adopted, and the date it was modified.

